For many Americans, the quality of Christmas is determined by the quality of the presents. This is especially true for our children, and some of them literally spend months anticipating their haul on Christmas morning. I know that when I was growing up Christmas was all about the presents. Yes, adults would give lip service to the other elements of Christmas, but all of the other holiday activities could have faded away and it still would have been Christmas as long as presents were under that tree on the morning of December 25th. Perhaps things are different in your family, but it is undeniable that for our society as a whole gifts are the central feature of the holiday season.
And that is why so many parents feel such immense pressure to spend a tremendous amount of money on gifts for their children each year. Of course this pressure that they feel is constantly being reinforced by television ads and big Hollywood movies that continuously hammer home what a “good Christmas” should look like.
Once again in 2016, parents will spend far more money than they should because they want to make their children happy. According to a brand new survey from T. Rowe Price, parents in the United States will spend an average of 422 dollars per child this holiday season…
More than half of parents report they aim to get everything on their kids’ wish lists this year, spending an average of $422 per child, according to a new survey from T. Rowe Price.
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Showing posts with label Private Credit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Private Credit. Show all posts
December 20, 2016
September 2, 2016
Small Business Defaults Rise, Borrowing Drops: "What Scares Us Is The Rise In Delinquencies"
Yesterday, we pointed out something disturbing when we looked at the latest NACM Credit Manager Index report: over the past year it had declined steadily, hitting the lowest print since 2009, or as the National Asscoiation of Credit Managers' economist Chris Kuehl said “Overall, it was fun while it lasted - the trends had been up and now they aren’t" adding that “the best that can be said about the decline is that it was bad and hasn’t gotten much worse.... The sales collapse is consistent with what has been appearing in the Purchasing Managers’ Index and other statistics, so it is unlikely to be an anomaly, not good timing as far as the retail community is concerned.”
Today, we got a validating, and equally concerning, perspective on how small businesses are doing, courtesy of the latest Thomson Reuters/PayNet Small Business Lending Index, which fell to 121.5 in July, the lowest level since January and down from an upwardly revised 139.2 in June.
But while the headline decline was mildly troubling, the details within the report were worse: according to PayNet, borrowing by U.S. small businesses sank in July, with more firms late on repaying existing loans, trends which according to Reuters "point to softer economic growth ahead."
More troubling is that companies are increasingly struggling to pay back existing debts. Loans more than 30 days past due rose in July to 1.63%, the fourth straight monthly increase and the highest delinquency rate since December 2012, separate data from PayNet showed.
Read the entire article
Today, we got a validating, and equally concerning, perspective on how small businesses are doing, courtesy of the latest Thomson Reuters/PayNet Small Business Lending Index, which fell to 121.5 in July, the lowest level since January and down from an upwardly revised 139.2 in June.
But while the headline decline was mildly troubling, the details within the report were worse: according to PayNet, borrowing by U.S. small businesses sank in July, with more firms late on repaying existing loans, trends which according to Reuters "point to softer economic growth ahead."
More troubling is that companies are increasingly struggling to pay back existing debts. Loans more than 30 days past due rose in July to 1.63%, the fourth straight monthly increase and the highest delinquency rate since December 2012, separate data from PayNet showed.
Read the entire article
February 25, 2016
The New Shadow Banks: Private Equity Becomes Private Credit
As regulators have sought to curb bank instability, in many cases, the result hasn’t been risk reduction, but merely the transfer of the same risks to different players. Increasingly, the new risk takers are investors. One place this has occurred on a large scale, yet gotten very little notice, is how private equity funds, whose business model depends on high levels of borrowing, have gone into the shadow banking business to supplant banks as their debt suppliers.
A combination of regulatory intervention and residual memory of the 2007-2008 buyout frenzy has restrained some of the worst behavior. The Volcker Rule forced the banks that were active in private equity to shed most of these assets. Globally, annual buyout fundraising amounts remain a quarter below their peaks of 2007 and 2008. In Europe the total value of buyout transactions in 2015, although up a quarter on prior year according to the Centre for Management Buyout Research, was still half that recorded in 2007. Extreme behaviours such as quick flips and repeat dividend recaps have been partly curtailed by the European Union’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. US bank regulators have guidelines for banks to limit leverage assigned to LBOs to 6 times EBITDA. And the worst performing fund managers have been shunned by LPs – natural selection has operated as intended by preventing incompetent managers from gorging themselves on fees for another ten-year vintage. No doubt it will take a little while for these zombie funds to disappear, but if LPs remain disciplined and strong-willed, disappear they shall.
Yet a new source of risk, that of PE groups “diversifying” their fee-earning activities by building private debt businesses, is now almost entirely outside regulatory reach. Whilst several of these investors had arguably been very active on the credit side for years and can claim real expertise, others piled on opportunistically as their levered portfolio companies were in dire need of balance-sheet restructuring. And frankly the initial nibbling quickly turned into a feast, so discounted were some of these companies’ LBO loans. In 2009 and 2010, a vast array of mega-buyout debt tranches were trading well below par, with high-profile transactions like Caesars and TXU seeing their unsecured loans hit 20 cents on the dollar or less. It was too tempting an occasion for some PE groups to resist.
Read the entire article
A combination of regulatory intervention and residual memory of the 2007-2008 buyout frenzy has restrained some of the worst behavior. The Volcker Rule forced the banks that were active in private equity to shed most of these assets. Globally, annual buyout fundraising amounts remain a quarter below their peaks of 2007 and 2008. In Europe the total value of buyout transactions in 2015, although up a quarter on prior year according to the Centre for Management Buyout Research, was still half that recorded in 2007. Extreme behaviours such as quick flips and repeat dividend recaps have been partly curtailed by the European Union’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive. US bank regulators have guidelines for banks to limit leverage assigned to LBOs to 6 times EBITDA. And the worst performing fund managers have been shunned by LPs – natural selection has operated as intended by preventing incompetent managers from gorging themselves on fees for another ten-year vintage. No doubt it will take a little while for these zombie funds to disappear, but if LPs remain disciplined and strong-willed, disappear they shall.
Yet a new source of risk, that of PE groups “diversifying” their fee-earning activities by building private debt businesses, is now almost entirely outside regulatory reach. Whilst several of these investors had arguably been very active on the credit side for years and can claim real expertise, others piled on opportunistically as their levered portfolio companies were in dire need of balance-sheet restructuring. And frankly the initial nibbling quickly turned into a feast, so discounted were some of these companies’ LBO loans. In 2009 and 2010, a vast array of mega-buyout debt tranches were trading well below par, with high-profile transactions like Caesars and TXU seeing their unsecured loans hit 20 cents on the dollar or less. It was too tempting an occasion for some PE groups to resist.
Read the entire article
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