Is Jamie Dimon about to get the old bonesaw for leaving $180BN on the table?
Saudi Arabia's oil company Aramco soared 10% limit up on its first day of trading, reaching a valuation of $1.88 trillion, higher than any other publicly traded company in the world. This means that after pricing its IPO at $1.7 trillion, Jamie Dimon left about $180 billion on the table, which will hardly impress the Crown Prince.
The record valuation reflects an oversubscribed book of mostly local investors who bought shares on the Saudi Tadawul stock exchange after they were forced by Riyadh to pump the stock.
Aramco only sold a tiny 1.5% sliver in the company, meaning that the kingdom and Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia (PIF) could easily manipulate the price with such a small fraction of the stock public. Aramco listed on the Tadawul exchange because of other international exchanges and their investors found it hard to value the oil company near the $2 trillion levels.
"They have had to launch the IPO on their own stock exchange as the valuation was unlikely to be achieved elsewhere," said John Colley, associate dean at Warwick Business School in the U.K, who spoke with Reuters.
Read the entire article
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Showing posts with label Banksters. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Banksters. Show all posts
December 11, 2019
December 3, 2019
The Problem With "Green" Monetary Policy
As an alarming new United Nations report shows, climate change is probably the biggest challenge of our time. But should central banks also be worrying about the issue? If so, what should they be doing about it?
Central-bank representatives who do decide to make public speeches about climate change cannot deny the scale and scope of the problem; to do so would be to risk their own credibility. But the same is true when central bankers feel obliged to discuss the distribution of income and wealth, rising crime rates, or any other newsworthy topic. The more that central banks’ communications strategy focuses on trying to make themselves “popular” in the public’s eyes, the greater the temptation to address topics outside their primary remit.
Beyond communicating with the public, the question, of course, is whether central banks should try to account for environmental considerations when shaping monetary policy. Obviously, climate change and corresponding government policies in response to it can have powerful effects on economic development. These consequences are reflected in all kinds of variables – growth, inflation, employment levels – that will in turn affect central-bank forecasts and influence monetary-policy decisions.
Likewise, natural disasters and other environmental events – actual or potential – can pose implicit risks to entire classes of financial assets. Regulators and supervisors charged with assessing risk and associated capital needs must take this environmental dimension into account. At a minimum, the high uncertainty stemming from these risks implies a huge challenge for assessing the stability of the financial system and corresponding macroprudential measures. And these risk factors are also increasingly relevant for monetary-policy decisions, such as when central banks should buy bonds or (in some cases) equities.
But the growing public demand that central banks contribute more actively to the fight against climate change leads to a different dimension. In theory, central banks could introduce preferential interest rates for “green” activities – thus driving up the prices of “green bonds” – while adopting a more negative attitude toward noxious assets, such as those tied to fossil fuels. And yet, assessing whether and to what extent an asset is environmentally harmful or helpful would be extremely difficult.
Putting aside these more technical issues, the broader question remains: Should central banks assume responsibility for implementing policies to combat climate change? A number of prominent central bankers have already argued that they should. And current proposals for extending central banks’ mandate have come on top of growing concerns about income distribution and other issues tangentially related to monetary policy.
One is reminded of an ironic comment by the great Chicago School economist Jacob Viner.
Read the entire article
Central-bank representatives who do decide to make public speeches about climate change cannot deny the scale and scope of the problem; to do so would be to risk their own credibility. But the same is true when central bankers feel obliged to discuss the distribution of income and wealth, rising crime rates, or any other newsworthy topic. The more that central banks’ communications strategy focuses on trying to make themselves “popular” in the public’s eyes, the greater the temptation to address topics outside their primary remit.
Beyond communicating with the public, the question, of course, is whether central banks should try to account for environmental considerations when shaping monetary policy. Obviously, climate change and corresponding government policies in response to it can have powerful effects on economic development. These consequences are reflected in all kinds of variables – growth, inflation, employment levels – that will in turn affect central-bank forecasts and influence monetary-policy decisions.
Likewise, natural disasters and other environmental events – actual or potential – can pose implicit risks to entire classes of financial assets. Regulators and supervisors charged with assessing risk and associated capital needs must take this environmental dimension into account. At a minimum, the high uncertainty stemming from these risks implies a huge challenge for assessing the stability of the financial system and corresponding macroprudential measures. And these risk factors are also increasingly relevant for monetary-policy decisions, such as when central banks should buy bonds or (in some cases) equities.
But the growing public demand that central banks contribute more actively to the fight against climate change leads to a different dimension. In theory, central banks could introduce preferential interest rates for “green” activities – thus driving up the prices of “green bonds” – while adopting a more negative attitude toward noxious assets, such as those tied to fossil fuels. And yet, assessing whether and to what extent an asset is environmentally harmful or helpful would be extremely difficult.
Putting aside these more technical issues, the broader question remains: Should central banks assume responsibility for implementing policies to combat climate change? A number of prominent central bankers have already argued that they should. And current proposals for extending central banks’ mandate have come on top of growing concerns about income distribution and other issues tangentially related to monetary policy.
One is reminded of an ironic comment by the great Chicago School economist Jacob Viner.
Read the entire article
November 27, 2019
European Central Banks Are Slowly Preparing For Plan B: Gold
It was long believed in the gold space that Western central banks are against gold, but things have changed, for quite some years now. Instead of discouraging people from buying gold, or convincing them that gold is an irrelevant asset, many of these central banks are increasingly honest about the true properties of this monetary metal. Stating that gold is the ultimate store of value, that it preserves its purchasing power through time and is a global means of payment. Such statements, combined with actions that will be discussed below, reveal that more and more central banks are preparing for plan B.
The Bundesbank (the German central bank) published a book last year named Germany’s Gold. In the introduction, written by the President of the Bundesbank Jens Weidmann, the view of this bank leaves no room for interpretation. Weidmann writes (emphasis mine):
Ask anyone in Germany what they associate with gold and, more often than not, they will say that it is synonymous with enduring value and economic prosperity.
Ask us at the Bundesbank what our gold holdings mean for us and we will tell you that, first and foremost, they make up a very large share of Germany’s reserve assets ... [and they] are a major anchor underpinning confidence in the intrinsic value of the Bundesbank’s balance sheet.
The Bundesbank produced this publication to give a detailed account, the first of its kind, of how gold has grown in importance over the course of history, first as medium of payment, later as the bedrock of stability for the international monetary system.
Read the entire article
The Bundesbank (the German central bank) published a book last year named Germany’s Gold. In the introduction, written by the President of the Bundesbank Jens Weidmann, the view of this bank leaves no room for interpretation. Weidmann writes (emphasis mine):
Ask anyone in Germany what they associate with gold and, more often than not, they will say that it is synonymous with enduring value and economic prosperity.
Ask us at the Bundesbank what our gold holdings mean for us and we will tell you that, first and foremost, they make up a very large share of Germany’s reserve assets ... [and they] are a major anchor underpinning confidence in the intrinsic value of the Bundesbank’s balance sheet.
The Bundesbank produced this publication to give a detailed account, the first of its kind, of how gold has grown in importance over the course of history, first as medium of payment, later as the bedrock of stability for the international monetary system.
Read the entire article
November 22, 2019
UBS Has No Choice In Passing Negative Rate Pain To Customers
There's been talk that the Federal Reserve will slam interest rates to zero or even negative when the next recession strikes. President Trump's support for negative interest rates has quickly increased in the last several months as the latest tracking estimates for Q4 GDP have tumbled to sub 0.4%.
It seems that policy rates in the US are too high -- and will likely conform to the rest of the world, which is near zero to negative territory. This has undoubtedly alarmed UBS CEO Sergio Ermotti, who said banks have "no choice" but to pass on the negative rate pain to customers.
Ermotti said UBS "will not pass negative rates to smaller clients, the personal banking clients," that's because if UBS and other EU banks actually passed along negative rates to poor and middle-class families -- that would quickly spark unwanted social unrest that could crash the entire system.
"Right now, the threshold is very high still," Ermotti said. "It's difficult to make a prediction right now, but we are quite convinced it's not going to go down to smaller investors."
And of course, banking elites are smart enough not to pass on negative rates to poor people, but as per the Bloomberg interview, Ermotti will be targeting high-net-worth investors with more than 500,000 euros or 2 million Swiss francs.
G4 policy rates are near zero, with the exclusion of the US. But with the Federal Reserve embarking on a new interest rate cut cycle in response to collapsing global growth, it seems that policy rates across the world could go deeper into the negative territory through 2020.
The ECB and SNB have slammed rates into negative territory in recent years in hopes to stimulate domestic and regional growth by charging banks to deposit funds, rather than lending to consumers or businesses, Bloomberg noted.
Negative interest rates have been in an absolute disaster in Europe, with Germany teetering on the edge of a recession.
Though Trump on Twitter has been begging for negative rates for the last several months as the US economy grinds to halt in Q4. Trump could see negative rates, but it will be for all the wrong reasons, and then US banks will have to make the decision that European banks are currently going through, which is how to pass along negative rates to customers.
Read the entire article
It seems that policy rates in the US are too high -- and will likely conform to the rest of the world, which is near zero to negative territory. This has undoubtedly alarmed UBS CEO Sergio Ermotti, who said banks have "no choice" but to pass on the negative rate pain to customers.
Ermotti said UBS "will not pass negative rates to smaller clients, the personal banking clients," that's because if UBS and other EU banks actually passed along negative rates to poor and middle-class families -- that would quickly spark unwanted social unrest that could crash the entire system.
"Right now, the threshold is very high still," Ermotti said. "It's difficult to make a prediction right now, but we are quite convinced it's not going to go down to smaller investors."
And of course, banking elites are smart enough not to pass on negative rates to poor people, but as per the Bloomberg interview, Ermotti will be targeting high-net-worth investors with more than 500,000 euros or 2 million Swiss francs.
G4 policy rates are near zero, with the exclusion of the US. But with the Federal Reserve embarking on a new interest rate cut cycle in response to collapsing global growth, it seems that policy rates across the world could go deeper into the negative territory through 2020.
The ECB and SNB have slammed rates into negative territory in recent years in hopes to stimulate domestic and regional growth by charging banks to deposit funds, rather than lending to consumers or businesses, Bloomberg noted.
Negative interest rates have been in an absolute disaster in Europe, with Germany teetering on the edge of a recession.
Though Trump on Twitter has been begging for negative rates for the last several months as the US economy grinds to halt in Q4. Trump could see negative rates, but it will be for all the wrong reasons, and then US banks will have to make the decision that European banks are currently going through, which is how to pass along negative rates to customers.
Read the entire article
November 15, 2019
One Bank Finally Admits The Fed's "NOT QE" Is Indeed QE... And Could Lead To Financial Collapse
After a month of constant verbal gymnastics (and diarrhea from financial pundit sycophants who can't think creatively or originally and merely parrot their echo chamber in hopes of likes/retweets) by the Fed that the recent launch of $60 billion in T-Bill purchases is anything but QE (whatever you do, don't call it "QE 4", just call it "NOT QE" please), one bank finally had the guts to say what was so obvious to anyone who isn't challenged by simple logic: the Fed's "NOT QE" is really "QE."
In a note warning that the Fed's latest purchase program - whether one calls it QE or NOT QE - will have big, potentially catastrophic costs, Bank of America's Ralph Axel writes that in the aftermath of the Fed's new program of T-bill purchases to increase the amount of reserves in the banking system, the Fed made an effort to repeatedly inform markets that this is not a new round of quantitative easing, and yet as the BofA strategist notes, "in important ways it is similar."
But is it QE? Well, in his October FOMC press conference, Fed Chair Powell said "our T-bill purchases should not be confused with the large-scale asset purchase program that we deployed after the financial crisis. In contrast, purchasing Tbills should not materially affect demand and supply for longer-term securities or financial conditions more broadly." Chair Powell gives a succinct definition of QE as having two basic elements: (1) supporting longer-term security prices, and (2) easing financial conditions.
Here's the problem: as we have said since the beginning, and as Bank of America now writes, "the Fed's T-bill purchase program delivers on both fronts and is therefore similar to QE," with one exception - the element of forward guidance.
The upshot to this attempt to mislead the market what it is doing according to Bank of America, is that:
the Fed is continuing to "ease" even though rate cuts are now on hold, which is supportive of growth, higher interest rates and higher equities, and the Fed is loosening financial conditions by increasing the availability of, and lowering the cost of, leverage, which broadly supports asset prices potentially at the cost of increasing systemic financial risk.
Putting the Fed's "NOT QE" in context: so far the Fed has purchased $66bn of Tbills and may purchase $60bn per month through June 2020, which could result in an increase in the Fed's Treasury holdings by about $500bn.
While we have repeatedly written in the past why we think the Fed's latest asset purchase program is, in fact, QE, below we present BofA's argument why we are right.
As Axel writes, there are two basic mechanisms how T-Bill purchases support longer-term security prices: the increase in cash assets and deposit liabilities on bank balance sheets, and the reduction of funding risk for leveraged buyers of Treasuries, MBS and other financed securities.
For those who have forgotten how the "asset reflation" pathway works, recall that the Fed either buys T-bills from investors such as money market funds, or from primary dealers who do not hold T-bills, but can buy them at auction to sell to the Fed. Buying from investors converts their T-bill holdings into new Fed cash, which in turn winds up on deposit in the banking system. If instead a primary dealer buys a Tbill at auction and sells it to the Fed, the transaction results in new Fed cash placed in the Treasury's cash account, while the dealer balance sheet is unchanged, and the banking system balance is also unchanged. But once the Treasury spends the new Fed cash on a social security payment or a medical insurance bill, etc, the cash enters the banking system and increases the aggregate balance sheet of banks.
Either way, bank balance sheets expand and banks will need to (1) hold more HQLA (high quality liquid assets) against those deposits, and (2) put some of their new cash to work in longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities (or even stocks)? Although banks can be flexible in how they deploy the new cash, it is likely that a portion of it will go into bonds similar to what banks already hold (currently $1.8TN in MBS securities and $770bn in Treasuries, according to Fed H.8 data). And once bonds are bid, other investors have no choice but to reach for even riskier securities, such as stocks.
Meanwhile, while the Fed does not directly lend to leveraged investors, some of the increased cash on hand at banks will likely go into repo markets to fund overnight loans to potential buyers of long-term securities in Treasuries and mortgages. This, as BofA explains, is how the increase in reserves is designed to calm repo markets. The amount of bank lending in repo has increased by about 50% since the end of 2017.
Focusing just on the increasingly more important repo channel, which is one ingredient within overall financial conditions, is becoming more important as reliance on overnight funding and leverage continues to rise. This is because, as BofA shows in its "chart of the day", while banks and security brokers have greatly reduced reliance on overnight funding as a result of Dodd-Frank, the rest of the market has approximately doubled its reliance on overnight funding since the 2008 crisis.
Read the entire article
In a note warning that the Fed's latest purchase program - whether one calls it QE or NOT QE - will have big, potentially catastrophic costs, Bank of America's Ralph Axel writes that in the aftermath of the Fed's new program of T-bill purchases to increase the amount of reserves in the banking system, the Fed made an effort to repeatedly inform markets that this is not a new round of quantitative easing, and yet as the BofA strategist notes, "in important ways it is similar."
But is it QE? Well, in his October FOMC press conference, Fed Chair Powell said "our T-bill purchases should not be confused with the large-scale asset purchase program that we deployed after the financial crisis. In contrast, purchasing Tbills should not materially affect demand and supply for longer-term securities or financial conditions more broadly." Chair Powell gives a succinct definition of QE as having two basic elements: (1) supporting longer-term security prices, and (2) easing financial conditions.
Here's the problem: as we have said since the beginning, and as Bank of America now writes, "the Fed's T-bill purchase program delivers on both fronts and is therefore similar to QE," with one exception - the element of forward guidance.
The upshot to this attempt to mislead the market what it is doing according to Bank of America, is that:
the Fed is continuing to "ease" even though rate cuts are now on hold, which is supportive of growth, higher interest rates and higher equities, and the Fed is loosening financial conditions by increasing the availability of, and lowering the cost of, leverage, which broadly supports asset prices potentially at the cost of increasing systemic financial risk.
Putting the Fed's "NOT QE" in context: so far the Fed has purchased $66bn of Tbills and may purchase $60bn per month through June 2020, which could result in an increase in the Fed's Treasury holdings by about $500bn.
While we have repeatedly written in the past why we think the Fed's latest asset purchase program is, in fact, QE, below we present BofA's argument why we are right.
As Axel writes, there are two basic mechanisms how T-Bill purchases support longer-term security prices: the increase in cash assets and deposit liabilities on bank balance sheets, and the reduction of funding risk for leveraged buyers of Treasuries, MBS and other financed securities.
For those who have forgotten how the "asset reflation" pathway works, recall that the Fed either buys T-bills from investors such as money market funds, or from primary dealers who do not hold T-bills, but can buy them at auction to sell to the Fed. Buying from investors converts their T-bill holdings into new Fed cash, which in turn winds up on deposit in the banking system. If instead a primary dealer buys a Tbill at auction and sells it to the Fed, the transaction results in new Fed cash placed in the Treasury's cash account, while the dealer balance sheet is unchanged, and the banking system balance is also unchanged. But once the Treasury spends the new Fed cash on a social security payment or a medical insurance bill, etc, the cash enters the banking system and increases the aggregate balance sheet of banks.
Either way, bank balance sheets expand and banks will need to (1) hold more HQLA (high quality liquid assets) against those deposits, and (2) put some of their new cash to work in longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities (or even stocks)? Although banks can be flexible in how they deploy the new cash, it is likely that a portion of it will go into bonds similar to what banks already hold (currently $1.8TN in MBS securities and $770bn in Treasuries, according to Fed H.8 data). And once bonds are bid, other investors have no choice but to reach for even riskier securities, such as stocks.
Meanwhile, while the Fed does not directly lend to leveraged investors, some of the increased cash on hand at banks will likely go into repo markets to fund overnight loans to potential buyers of long-term securities in Treasuries and mortgages. This, as BofA explains, is how the increase in reserves is designed to calm repo markets. The amount of bank lending in repo has increased by about 50% since the end of 2017.
Focusing just on the increasingly more important repo channel, which is one ingredient within overall financial conditions, is becoming more important as reliance on overnight funding and leverage continues to rise. This is because, as BofA shows in its "chart of the day", while banks and security brokers have greatly reduced reliance on overnight funding as a result of Dodd-Frank, the rest of the market has approximately doubled its reliance on overnight funding since the 2008 crisis.
Read the entire article
November 12, 2019
Is The ECB Pricing Investors Out Of The Primary Market?
Christmas has come early for Europe, with Mario Draghi’s goodbye present to the market of further quantitative easing (“QE”). The ECB has kicked off its latest round of asset purchases. While this will undoubtedly be supportive for European credit, I feel much of the impact is already priced in to the secondary market. With a large book to fill, a significant part of the ECB’s ammunition is likely to be deployed in the primary market.
The ECB buying will clearly be supportive for corporate bonds, but just how material is the buying going to be? Wolfgang Bauer recently wrote a blog (here) looking at the impact of this latest round of QE. This time, the ECB is buying from a much lower base.
To assess what impact they might have, I think it’s useful to look at the volume of supply we’ve had, and probable ECB participation going forward. Looking at the breakdown by investor type for the recent Daimler new issue (A-rated by Fitch) from 30th Nov as an example, I estimate that around €535m of the €4bn deal was bought by the ECB – a rough exercise admittedly. This is a significant amount of the expected purchases per month (around 10% if we assume higher end of €5bn of purchases per month). And this is 13% of the €4bn deal too.
Shell also issued €3bn on 4th November which priced in line with the existing secondary curve. I estimate ECB participation was around 25% of this deal – a further €750m. If the ECB continues to buy such a significant proportion of issuance, we will likely see investors priced out of new issuance as deals come with zero new issuance premium. This primary participation will be very important dynamic to monitor, and one which investors will be watching for a number of prolific issuers – with VW another likely contender.
We have had a bumper year of corporate supply, largely due to low financing costs in Europe. A large proportion of this has been ‘reverse yankees’ – US issuers taking advantage of low Euro financing costs. I have excluded these from the analysis as the ECB can only purchase European issues. Still, YTD 2019 issuance has been €476bn (up 27% from last year). The chart below shows the total senior corporate supply, ex reverse yankees, for last three months across all credit ratings.
The practice and velocity of ECB buying will be a supportive factor for spreads in November but, in my opinion, this will be reasonably small in absolute terms. The ECB and its buying boots have undoubtedly boosted market sentiment but, after the initial Dealer inventories of high quality eligible paper have been hoovered up by the central bank, the greater extent of the move will be in its effect on wider BBB eligible names and non-eligible paper – so-called beta compression.
I expect the ECB will come out the traps at a good pace. Expectations for supply in November remain healthy, albeit reducing, so the run-rate is likely to be ahead of the long-term rate in the early phase of the programme. Today will be an interesting date as we will have a summary of ECB purchases from last week – so we can see for ourselves how busy the central banks have been!
ECB purchases are expected to increase in 2020 as redemptions from QE round one roll off. This technical tailwind will therefore increase in strength and undoubtedly continue to be supportive for spreads. However the effect of CSPP crowding out investors, particularly in the primary market, seems far more diminished in the face of declining European growth. Investors are cautious on moving down the capital structure with valuations looking ever more stretched versus fundamentals.
Read the entire article
The ECB buying will clearly be supportive for corporate bonds, but just how material is the buying going to be? Wolfgang Bauer recently wrote a blog (here) looking at the impact of this latest round of QE. This time, the ECB is buying from a much lower base.
To assess what impact they might have, I think it’s useful to look at the volume of supply we’ve had, and probable ECB participation going forward. Looking at the breakdown by investor type for the recent Daimler new issue (A-rated by Fitch) from 30th Nov as an example, I estimate that around €535m of the €4bn deal was bought by the ECB – a rough exercise admittedly. This is a significant amount of the expected purchases per month (around 10% if we assume higher end of €5bn of purchases per month). And this is 13% of the €4bn deal too.
Shell also issued €3bn on 4th November which priced in line with the existing secondary curve. I estimate ECB participation was around 25% of this deal – a further €750m. If the ECB continues to buy such a significant proportion of issuance, we will likely see investors priced out of new issuance as deals come with zero new issuance premium. This primary participation will be very important dynamic to monitor, and one which investors will be watching for a number of prolific issuers – with VW another likely contender.
We have had a bumper year of corporate supply, largely due to low financing costs in Europe. A large proportion of this has been ‘reverse yankees’ – US issuers taking advantage of low Euro financing costs. I have excluded these from the analysis as the ECB can only purchase European issues. Still, YTD 2019 issuance has been €476bn (up 27% from last year). The chart below shows the total senior corporate supply, ex reverse yankees, for last three months across all credit ratings.
The practice and velocity of ECB buying will be a supportive factor for spreads in November but, in my opinion, this will be reasonably small in absolute terms. The ECB and its buying boots have undoubtedly boosted market sentiment but, after the initial Dealer inventories of high quality eligible paper have been hoovered up by the central bank, the greater extent of the move will be in its effect on wider BBB eligible names and non-eligible paper – so-called beta compression.
I expect the ECB will come out the traps at a good pace. Expectations for supply in November remain healthy, albeit reducing, so the run-rate is likely to be ahead of the long-term rate in the early phase of the programme. Today will be an interesting date as we will have a summary of ECB purchases from last week – so we can see for ourselves how busy the central banks have been!
ECB purchases are expected to increase in 2020 as redemptions from QE round one roll off. This technical tailwind will therefore increase in strength and undoubtedly continue to be supportive for spreads. However the effect of CSPP crowding out investors, particularly in the primary market, seems far more diminished in the face of declining European growth. Investors are cautious on moving down the capital structure with valuations looking ever more stretched versus fundamentals.
Read the entire article
November 11, 2019
Bank Behind World's Largest Money Laundering Scandal Offered Russians Gold Bars To Hide Their Fortune
When we last looked at Danske Bank, the Danish lender was at the center of what has been dubbed the world's largest, $220 billion money-laundering scandal that allegedly involved Russians transferring funds offshore in violation of European regulations (it also involved the chronically criminal Deutsche Bank). Then, two months ago, the scandal took a lethal turn when the CEO of the bank's Estonia branch was found dead in a still-unexplained suicide. Now, we learn of yet another bizarre twist in what some have dubbed the biggest dirty money scandal of all time: the Danish lender was offering gold bars to wealthy clients to help them keep their fortunes hidden.
According to Bloomberg, the bank’s Estonian branch - whose CEO committed suicide - which was already wiring billions of client dollars to offshore accounts, told a select group of mostly Russian customers some time around 2012, that they could now also convert their money into gold bars and coins.
So for those asking the benefits of holding money in physical gold instead of fiat (or crypto), here is the answer: aside from offering a hedge against risk, Danske presented gold as a way for clients to achieve “anonymity,” according to the documents. More importantly, the bank said that using gold ensured "portability" of assets, according to an internal presentation dated June 2012.
As one would expect, the gold/money-laundering service did not come cheap: Danske charged a fee of 0.5% on larger orders, while smaller orders had a commission of as much as 4%.
This is the first time we learn that Danske offered such "services" - in the bank's own report on its non-resident unit, the bank listed the services it provided to clients. Aside from payments, these included setting up foreign-exchange lines, as well as bond and securities trading. The bank didn’t list the sale of gold bars.
While it’s not known how much gold Danske managed to sell while the now defunct Estonian unit was still running, an internal email seen by Bloomberg revealed that at least some clients used the service. Local private banking clients were also offered the service.
Furthermore, for gold bars weighing 250 grams or more, Danske clients could obtain the precious metal without a sealed pack or paper certificates. Bloomberg adds that anti-money laundering approval was needed before customers could collect the gold, but such approvals weren’t necessary if the gold was kept in long-term storage, according to the documents.
Read the entire article
According to Bloomberg, the bank’s Estonian branch - whose CEO committed suicide - which was already wiring billions of client dollars to offshore accounts, told a select group of mostly Russian customers some time around 2012, that they could now also convert their money into gold bars and coins.
So for those asking the benefits of holding money in physical gold instead of fiat (or crypto), here is the answer: aside from offering a hedge against risk, Danske presented gold as a way for clients to achieve “anonymity,” according to the documents. More importantly, the bank said that using gold ensured "portability" of assets, according to an internal presentation dated June 2012.
As one would expect, the gold/money-laundering service did not come cheap: Danske charged a fee of 0.5% on larger orders, while smaller orders had a commission of as much as 4%.
This is the first time we learn that Danske offered such "services" - in the bank's own report on its non-resident unit, the bank listed the services it provided to clients. Aside from payments, these included setting up foreign-exchange lines, as well as bond and securities trading. The bank didn’t list the sale of gold bars.
While it’s not known how much gold Danske managed to sell while the now defunct Estonian unit was still running, an internal email seen by Bloomberg revealed that at least some clients used the service. Local private banking clients were also offered the service.
Furthermore, for gold bars weighing 250 grams or more, Danske clients could obtain the precious metal without a sealed pack or paper certificates. Bloomberg adds that anti-money laundering approval was needed before customers could collect the gold, but such approvals weren’t necessary if the gold was kept in long-term storage, according to the documents.
Read the entire article
November 5, 2019
The Deutsche Bank Death Watch Has Taken A Very Interesting Turn
The biggest bank in Europe is in the process of imploding, and there are persistent rumors that the final collapse could happen sooner rather than later. Those that follow my work on a regular basis already know that this is a story that I have been following for years. Deutsche Bank is rapidly bleeding cash, they have been laying off thousands of workers, and the vultures have been circling as company executives desperately try to implement a turnaround plan. Unfortunately for Deutsche Bank, it may already be too late. And if Deutsche Bank goes down, it will be even more catastrophic for the global financial system than the collapse of Lehman Brothers was in 2008. Germany is the glue that is holding the EU together, and so if the bank that is right at the heart of Germany’s financial system collapses, the dominoes will likely start falling very rapidly.
There has been a tremendous amount of speculation about Deutsche Bank over the past several days, and so let’s start with what we know.
We know that Deutsche Bank has been losing money at a pace that is absolutely staggering…
Deutsche Bank reported a net loss that missed market expectations on Wednesday as a major restructuring plan continues to weigh on the German lender.
Read the entire article
November 1, 2019
Chinese Bank On Verge Of Collapse After Sudden Bank Run
First it was Baoshang Bank , then it was Bank of Jinzhou, then, two months ago, China's Heng Feng Bank with 1.4 trillion yuan in assets, quietly failed and was just as quietly nationalized. Today, a fourth prominent Chinese bank was on the verge of collapse under the weight of its bad loans, only this time the failure was far less quiet, as depositors of the rural lender swarmed the bank's retail outlets, demanding their money in an angry demonstration of what Beijing is terrified of the most: a bank run.
Local business leaders, political cadres and banking executives rallied Thursday at the main branch of Henan Yichuan Rural Commercial Bank, just outside the central Chinese city of Luoyang, where they stood one by one before a microphone to pledge their backing for the bank, as smiling employees brandished wads of cash before television cameras to demonstrate just how much cash, literally, the bank had.
It was China's latest, and most desperate attempt yet to project stability and reassure the public that all is well after rumors spread that the bank’s chairman was in trouble and the bank was on the brink of insolvency. However, as the WSJ reports, it wasn’t enough for 31-year-old Li Xue, who showed up for the third day Thursday to withdraw thousands of yuan of her mother’s life savings after hearing from fellow villagers that Yichuan Bank - which is the largest lender in Yichuan county by the number of branches and capital, and it is also a member of PBOC’s deposit insurance system, according to the local government - was going under.
Just like any self-respecting Ponzi scheme, the bank's branch managers tried to persuade her to keep her money with them until March, when her mother’s three-year deposits would mature, yielding more than 10,000 yuan in interest. And then, just like any Ponzi scheme, to sweeten the offer, the bank managers also offered her even higher-yielding products, plus supermarket gift cards, just to keep her money there..
"Our bank is state-backed, and your money is insured by deposit insurance," one female manager told her, but Ms. Li refused, her confidence in the state's lies crushed.
“We really can’t afford to lose the money,” she said.
The bank run at Yichuan Bank, located in China's landlocked province of Henan, makes it at least the fourth bank that authorities have rushed to rescue this year. It won't be the last.
Read the entire article
Local business leaders, political cadres and banking executives rallied Thursday at the main branch of Henan Yichuan Rural Commercial Bank, just outside the central Chinese city of Luoyang, where they stood one by one before a microphone to pledge their backing for the bank, as smiling employees brandished wads of cash before television cameras to demonstrate just how much cash, literally, the bank had.
It was China's latest, and most desperate attempt yet to project stability and reassure the public that all is well after rumors spread that the bank’s chairman was in trouble and the bank was on the brink of insolvency. However, as the WSJ reports, it wasn’t enough for 31-year-old Li Xue, who showed up for the third day Thursday to withdraw thousands of yuan of her mother’s life savings after hearing from fellow villagers that Yichuan Bank - which is the largest lender in Yichuan county by the number of branches and capital, and it is also a member of PBOC’s deposit insurance system, according to the local government - was going under.
Just like any self-respecting Ponzi scheme, the bank's branch managers tried to persuade her to keep her money with them until March, when her mother’s three-year deposits would mature, yielding more than 10,000 yuan in interest. And then, just like any Ponzi scheme, to sweeten the offer, the bank managers also offered her even higher-yielding products, plus supermarket gift cards, just to keep her money there..
"Our bank is state-backed, and your money is insured by deposit insurance," one female manager told her, but Ms. Li refused, her confidence in the state's lies crushed.
“We really can’t afford to lose the money,” she said.
The bank run at Yichuan Bank, located in China's landlocked province of Henan, makes it at least the fourth bank that authorities have rushed to rescue this year. It won't be the last.
Read the entire article
October 28, 2019
Innovation BIS 2025: A Stepping Stone Towards An Economic "New World Order"
The IMF’s annual meetings held in Washington DC last week demonstrated that when the institution issues new economic projections or warnings of a downturn, the mainstream press are not averse to giving them prominent coverage. After the Fund was founded in 1944 (off the back of World War Two), it became part of what internationalists call the ‘rules based global order‘. For 75 years, the IMF has been regarded by the political establishment and banking elites as a lynch pin of the world financial system.
Contrary to what some may believe, the IMF was not the first global monetary institution.
That accolade belongs to the Swiss based Bank for International Settlements, which predates the IMF by fourteen years. Its creation in 1930 was, according to the BIS, primarily to settle reparation payments ‘imposed on Germany following the First World War‘. Without WWI – a major crisis event – there would have been no mandate for the BIS to exist. Much as there would have been no mandate for the IMF to exist were it not for the spectre of WWII.
As well as settling German reparation payments, the BIS was also recognised from the outset as a forum for central bankers – the first of its kind – where they could speak candidly and direct the course of global monetary policy.
The board of directors at the BIS is taken up predominantly by the heads of the leading central banks in the world. Right now the governor of the German Bundesbank Jens Weidmann is chairman of the board. As public servants they gather in Basel every eight weeks or so for a series of bimonthly meetings, the discussions from which ordinary citizens are not privy to.
In 2013 author Adam Labor published a book called ‘The Tower of Basel‘ which analysed certain key figureheads behind the early years of the BIS. What Labor detailed is how many of them were integral members of the Nazi regime.
Read the entire article
Contrary to what some may believe, the IMF was not the first global monetary institution.
That accolade belongs to the Swiss based Bank for International Settlements, which predates the IMF by fourteen years. Its creation in 1930 was, according to the BIS, primarily to settle reparation payments ‘imposed on Germany following the First World War‘. Without WWI – a major crisis event – there would have been no mandate for the BIS to exist. Much as there would have been no mandate for the IMF to exist were it not for the spectre of WWII.
As well as settling German reparation payments, the BIS was also recognised from the outset as a forum for central bankers – the first of its kind – where they could speak candidly and direct the course of global monetary policy.
The board of directors at the BIS is taken up predominantly by the heads of the leading central banks in the world. Right now the governor of the German Bundesbank Jens Weidmann is chairman of the board. As public servants they gather in Basel every eight weeks or so for a series of bimonthly meetings, the discussions from which ordinary citizens are not privy to.
In 2013 author Adam Labor published a book called ‘The Tower of Basel‘ which analysed certain key figureheads behind the early years of the BIS. What Labor detailed is how many of them were integral members of the Nazi regime.
Read the entire article
October 23, 2019
China Just Injected The Most Liquidity Since January... And It's Not Enough
Just days after China's GDP unexpectedly dropped to a sub-consensus 6.0%, the lowest in three decades (with Beijing now set to reveal a 5-handle GDP in the coming months), China watchers were convinced that this week would start with Beijing again lowering its "Libor rate", i.e., the previously discussed Loan Prime Rate, especially with the Fed expected to cut rates once again next week. However, that did not happen as China kept its one-year prime rate for new corporate loans unchanged in October, at 4.2%, and above the 4.15% consensus estimate. The five-year benchmark was also kept unchanged at 4.85%.
As we reported previously, the Loan Prime Rate, also called China's "Libor", is a revamped market indicator of the price that lenders charge clients for new loans, and is linked to the rate at which the central bank will lend financial institutions cash for a year. The rate, which is updated once a month, is made up of submissions from a panel of 18 banks, although ultimately it is Beijing that sets the final rate.
Analysts were quick to step in and "explain" away the unexpected move: Commerzbank's Zhou Hao said that a static one-year rate shows China “may be trying to balance the shrinking margins of banks with support to the real economy,” adding that "the PBOC remains restrained on policy easing.”
The market, however, was less sanguine, as the PBOC's lack of easing was promptly taken as an ill-omen: China's government bonds dropped while money-market rates climbed, amid bets that the policy makers are not in a rush to loosen monetary policy (why? perhaps China's gargantuan debt load and rapidly devaluing currency have something to do with it). On Monday, the yield on 10-year sovereign notes rose three basis points to 3.22%, the highest since July 1, while the costs on 12-month interest-rate swaps advanced to the highest level since late May.
While the Chinese economy has been under pressure amid a prolonged trade dispute with the US, many have expected that the central bank would match the Fed's easing and lower corporate borrowing costs and further cut bank reserve ratios. However, so far the PBOC hasn’t embarked on an aggressive stimulus program as some market watchers had hoped.
Read the entire article
As we reported previously, the Loan Prime Rate, also called China's "Libor", is a revamped market indicator of the price that lenders charge clients for new loans, and is linked to the rate at which the central bank will lend financial institutions cash for a year. The rate, which is updated once a month, is made up of submissions from a panel of 18 banks, although ultimately it is Beijing that sets the final rate.
Analysts were quick to step in and "explain" away the unexpected move: Commerzbank's Zhou Hao said that a static one-year rate shows China “may be trying to balance the shrinking margins of banks with support to the real economy,” adding that "the PBOC remains restrained on policy easing.”
The market, however, was less sanguine, as the PBOC's lack of easing was promptly taken as an ill-omen: China's government bonds dropped while money-market rates climbed, amid bets that the policy makers are not in a rush to loosen monetary policy (why? perhaps China's gargantuan debt load and rapidly devaluing currency have something to do with it). On Monday, the yield on 10-year sovereign notes rose three basis points to 3.22%, the highest since July 1, while the costs on 12-month interest-rate swaps advanced to the highest level since late May.
While the Chinese economy has been under pressure amid a prolonged trade dispute with the US, many have expected that the central bank would match the Fed's easing and lower corporate borrowing costs and further cut bank reserve ratios. However, so far the PBOC hasn’t embarked on an aggressive stimulus program as some market watchers had hoped.
Read the entire article
October 22, 2019
"We're Being Robbed" - Central Bank 'Stimulus' Is Really A Huge Redistribution Scheme
When an economy turns from expansion to contraction there is an order of events. The first signs are an unexpected increase in inventories of unsold goods, both accompanied with and followed by business surveys indicating a general softening in demand. For monetarists, this is often confirmed by an inverting yield curve, which tells them that at the margin the short-term rates set by the central bank are becoming too high for business conditions.
That was the position for the US 10-year bond less the 2-year bond very briefly at the end of August, since when this measure, which is often taken to predict recessions, has turned mildly positive again. A generally negative sentiment, fueled mainly by the escalating tariff war between America and China, had earlier alerted investors to an international trade slowdown, expected to undermine the American economy in due course along with all the others. It stands to reason that backward-looking statistics have yet to reflect the global slowdown on the US economy, which is still buoyed up by consumer credit. The German economy, which is driven by production rather than consumption is perhaps a better guide and is already in recession.
After an initial hit, a small recovery in investor sentiment is understandable, with the negative outlook perhaps having got ahead of itself. But we must look beyond that. History shows the combination of a peak in the credit cycle and tariffs can be economically lethal. A brief return to a positive yield curve achieves little more than a sucker rally. It may be enough to put further monetary expansion on pause. But when that is over, and jobs begin to be threatened, there can be no doubt that central banks will ramp up the printing presses.
So reliant have markets become on monetary expansion that the default assumption is that an economy will always be rescued from recession by an easing of monetary policy, and furthermore that monetary inflation will prevent it from being any more than mild and short. We see this in the performance of stock market indices, which reflect perpetual optimism.
Read the entire article
That was the position for the US 10-year bond less the 2-year bond very briefly at the end of August, since when this measure, which is often taken to predict recessions, has turned mildly positive again. A generally negative sentiment, fueled mainly by the escalating tariff war between America and China, had earlier alerted investors to an international trade slowdown, expected to undermine the American economy in due course along with all the others. It stands to reason that backward-looking statistics have yet to reflect the global slowdown on the US economy, which is still buoyed up by consumer credit. The German economy, which is driven by production rather than consumption is perhaps a better guide and is already in recession.
After an initial hit, a small recovery in investor sentiment is understandable, with the negative outlook perhaps having got ahead of itself. But we must look beyond that. History shows the combination of a peak in the credit cycle and tariffs can be economically lethal. A brief return to a positive yield curve achieves little more than a sucker rally. It may be enough to put further monetary expansion on pause. But when that is over, and jobs begin to be threatened, there can be no doubt that central banks will ramp up the printing presses.
So reliant have markets become on monetary expansion that the default assumption is that an economy will always be rescued from recession by an easing of monetary policy, and furthermore that monetary inflation will prevent it from being any more than mild and short. We see this in the performance of stock market indices, which reflect perpetual optimism.
Read the entire article
October 21, 2019
Here Is The Real Reason The Fed Restarted QE
In the past month, a feud has erupted in the financial media and across capital markets between defenders of the Fed, who praise the return of its unprecedented easing in the form of $60BN in monthly T-Bill purchases, by refusing to call it by its real name, and instead the Fed's fanclub calls it "not QE" (just so it doesn't appear that ten years after the Fed first launched QE, we are back to square one), and those who happen to be intellectually honest, and call the largest permanent expansion in the Fed's balance sheet, meant to ease financial conditions and boost liquidity across the financial sector, for what it is: QE.
It is this same "not QE" that has boosted the Fed's balance sheet by $200BN in one month, the fastest rate of increase since the financial crisis.
Yet while the Fed's desire to purchase Bills instead of coupon Treasuries was dictated by its superficial desire to distinguish the current "Not QE" from previous "True QEs", even though both tends to inject the same amount of liquidity into the system, which as a reminder is what the Fed's bailout role in the past 11 years has all been about, and only true Fed sycophants are unable to call a spade a spade, the Fed's choice raises a rather thorny question of where the Fed will source those T-bills, because as JPMorgan calculates, the net supply of Bills in 4Q19 and 1Q20 is around $115-$130bn while JPM's economists estimate that at least $200-$250bn of purchases could be required to return reserves to around $1.5tr where they were in early September this year.
That means the Fed might need to source purchases from money-market funds and foreign central banks - which paradoxically would serve to further drain liquidity out of the system. As such, given the limited alternatives, JPM's Nikolas Panagirtzoglou believes that the Fed may be reluctant to do so and if they do, some may chose to leave cash in the Fed’s ON RRP facility which would represent a drain on reserves and make T-bills a less efficient vehicle for reserve creation.
Another key question: what if just returning to the previous reserve baseline is not sufficient, and the Fed needs to return reserves to a higher level than $1.5tr? Indeed, with close to $200bn of reserves injected via overnight and term repos for much of this week...
Read the entire article
It is this same "not QE" that has boosted the Fed's balance sheet by $200BN in one month, the fastest rate of increase since the financial crisis.
Yet while the Fed's desire to purchase Bills instead of coupon Treasuries was dictated by its superficial desire to distinguish the current "Not QE" from previous "True QEs", even though both tends to inject the same amount of liquidity into the system, which as a reminder is what the Fed's bailout role in the past 11 years has all been about, and only true Fed sycophants are unable to call a spade a spade, the Fed's choice raises a rather thorny question of where the Fed will source those T-bills, because as JPMorgan calculates, the net supply of Bills in 4Q19 and 1Q20 is around $115-$130bn while JPM's economists estimate that at least $200-$250bn of purchases could be required to return reserves to around $1.5tr where they were in early September this year.
That means the Fed might need to source purchases from money-market funds and foreign central banks - which paradoxically would serve to further drain liquidity out of the system. As such, given the limited alternatives, JPM's Nikolas Panagirtzoglou believes that the Fed may be reluctant to do so and if they do, some may chose to leave cash in the Fed’s ON RRP facility which would represent a drain on reserves and make T-bills a less efficient vehicle for reserve creation.
Another key question: what if just returning to the previous reserve baseline is not sufficient, and the Fed needs to return reserves to a higher level than $1.5tr? Indeed, with close to $200bn of reserves injected via overnight and term repos for much of this week...
Read the entire article
October 18, 2019
HSBC Considers Slashing Equity Desks In London, New York, Germany
A mass exodus could be developing among major financial institutions, who seek to divest their equity sales and trading units.
Deutsche Bank and Nomura have already made it clear that they're reviewing their trading cash equities units because of profitability concerns.
Now HSBC might follow suit, sources told Bloomberg, adding that the bank could exit stock trading in Western markets as part of a significant overhaul program.
HSBC could slash trading units in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, in the near term, the source said. The bank's Asian equities operations wouldn't be affected by the overhaul.
HSBC will concentrate on the Greater China region, rather than Western markets in the 2020s, another source explained.
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker has spent the last several years restructuring the bank. He appointed Noel Quinn, the interim chief executive, in August, as a push to continue strengthening the bank through new, innovative cost-cutting measures.
The strategy by HSBC could cut at least 45 traders in New York.
Read the entire article
Deutsche Bank and Nomura have already made it clear that they're reviewing their trading cash equities units because of profitability concerns.
Now HSBC might follow suit, sources told Bloomberg, adding that the bank could exit stock trading in Western markets as part of a significant overhaul program.
HSBC could slash trading units in the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France, in the near term, the source said. The bank's Asian equities operations wouldn't be affected by the overhaul.
HSBC will concentrate on the Greater China region, rather than Western markets in the 2020s, another source explained.
HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker has spent the last several years restructuring the bank. He appointed Noel Quinn, the interim chief executive, in August, as a push to continue strengthening the bank through new, innovative cost-cutting measures.
The strategy by HSBC could cut at least 45 traders in New York.
Read the entire article
October 14, 2019
Central Bank Issues Stunning Warning: "If The Entire System Collapses, Gold Will Be Needed To Start Over"
It's not just "tinfoil blogs" who (for the past 11 years) have been warning that a monetary reset is inevitable and the only viable fallback option once trust and faith in fiat is lost, is a gold standard (something which even Mark Carney hinted at recently): central banks are joining the doom parade now too.
An article published by the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), or Dutch Central Bank, has shocked many with its claim that "if the system collapses, the gold stock can serve as a basis to build it up again. Gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank's balance sheet and creates a sense of security."
While gloomy predictions of a monetary reset are hardly new, they have traditionally been relegated to the fringe of mainstream financial thought - after all, as Mario Draghi stated on several occasions in recent years, the mere contemplation of a "doomsday scenario" is enough to create the self-fulfilling prophecy which materializes it. As such, it is stunning to see a mainstream financial institution open up about the superior value of limited supply, non-fiat, sound money assets. It is also hypocritical given the diametrically opposed Keynesian practices regularly engaged in by central banks and official institutions worldwide: after all, just a few months back, the IMF published a paper bashing Germany's adoption of the gold standard in the 1870s as the catalyst for instability in the global monetary system.
Fast forward to today, when the Dutch Central Bank is admitting not only did gold not destabilize the monetary system, but it will be its only savior when everything crashes.
Read the entire article
An article published by the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), or Dutch Central Bank, has shocked many with its claim that "if the system collapses, the gold stock can serve as a basis to build it up again. Gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank's balance sheet and creates a sense of security."
While gloomy predictions of a monetary reset are hardly new, they have traditionally been relegated to the fringe of mainstream financial thought - after all, as Mario Draghi stated on several occasions in recent years, the mere contemplation of a "doomsday scenario" is enough to create the self-fulfilling prophecy which materializes it. As such, it is stunning to see a mainstream financial institution open up about the superior value of limited supply, non-fiat, sound money assets. It is also hypocritical given the diametrically opposed Keynesian practices regularly engaged in by central banks and official institutions worldwide: after all, just a few months back, the IMF published a paper bashing Germany's adoption of the gold standard in the 1870s as the catalyst for instability in the global monetary system.
Fast forward to today, when the Dutch Central Bank is admitting not only did gold not destabilize the monetary system, but it will be its only savior when everything crashes.
Read the entire article
October 11, 2019
After Unveiling 'NotQE', Fed Eases Liquidity Rules For Foreign Banks (Rescues Deutsche)
Having cracked down on Deutsche Bank in the past, The Fed appears to be playing good-regulator/bad-regulator as The FT reports that Deutsche is expected to benefit most from an imminent change in The Fed's liquidity rules.
Specifically, US banking regulators have dropped an idea to subject local branches of foreign banks to tough new liquidity rules (forcing US branches of foreign banks to hold a minimum level of liquid assets to protect them from a cash crunch).
As The FT further details, people familiar with his thinking say Randal Quarles, the vice-chair for banking supervision at the Fed, accepts the banks’ argument that any liquidity rules on bank branches should only be imposed in conjunction with foreign regulators.
“Without some international agreement, we could have the situation where each country is trying to grab whatever isn’t nailed down if there is another scare.”
And Deutsche Bank benefits most (or rescued from major liquidity needs) since it has by far the largest assets in US branches...
Read the entire article
Specifically, US banking regulators have dropped an idea to subject local branches of foreign banks to tough new liquidity rules (forcing US branches of foreign banks to hold a minimum level of liquid assets to protect them from a cash crunch).
As The FT further details, people familiar with his thinking say Randal Quarles, the vice-chair for banking supervision at the Fed, accepts the banks’ argument that any liquidity rules on bank branches should only be imposed in conjunction with foreign regulators.
“Without some international agreement, we could have the situation where each country is trying to grab whatever isn’t nailed down if there is another scare.”
And Deutsche Bank benefits most (or rescued from major liquidity needs) since it has by far the largest assets in US branches...
Read the entire article
October 10, 2019
Debt Market Suffering "Quiet Meltdown" As Billions In Loans Are Suddenly Crashing
The exponential growth in the leveraged loan market, in the last several years, created an enormous excess accumulation of sub-investment grade loans that are a ticking time bomb when the next recession strikes.
Late last year, leveraged loan markets froze, for at least a month, as Treasury yields dropped, due to the increasing threat of a global recession. An abundance of fake trade news and central bank easing throughout 2019 saved Wall Street and reopened the leveraged loan market earlier in the year, but it seems that cracks are starting to develop again with recession threats building for 2020.
Bloomberg reports that 50 companies that have at least $40 billion of loans have lost about ten percentage points of face value in the last three months.
An exodus of investors has been seen in the leveraged loan market late-summer into early fall as liquidity dries up. It's mostly due to Treasury yields sinking, and end of cycle fears increasing, as a recession could emerge next year.
Some of the hardest-hit companies in the loan space in the last three months have been Amneal Pharmaceuticals, whose $2.7 billion loan due 2025 plunged about 80 cents on the dollar, and Seadrill Operating whose $2.6 billion loan maturing in 2021 only commands 53 cents on the dollar, said Bloomberg.
Read the entire article
Late last year, leveraged loan markets froze, for at least a month, as Treasury yields dropped, due to the increasing threat of a global recession. An abundance of fake trade news and central bank easing throughout 2019 saved Wall Street and reopened the leveraged loan market earlier in the year, but it seems that cracks are starting to develop again with recession threats building for 2020.
Bloomberg reports that 50 companies that have at least $40 billion of loans have lost about ten percentage points of face value in the last three months.
An exodus of investors has been seen in the leveraged loan market late-summer into early fall as liquidity dries up. It's mostly due to Treasury yields sinking, and end of cycle fears increasing, as a recession could emerge next year.
Some of the hardest-hit companies in the loan space in the last three months have been Amneal Pharmaceuticals, whose $2.7 billion loan due 2025 plunged about 80 cents on the dollar, and Seadrill Operating whose $2.6 billion loan maturing in 2021 only commands 53 cents on the dollar, said Bloomberg.
Read the entire article
October 9, 2019
The Surge In "Surprise" Medical Bills Bankrupting Americans Can Be Blamed On Private Equity
Surging "surprise" medical bills in the U.S. are private equity's fault, a new FT opinion piece claims.
These "surprise" medical bills continue to be a major talking point in the U.S. and are likely to be a key issue during the upcoming 2020 Presidential race. The term refers to invoices that are generated after a patient is admitted to the hospital and treated, without their knowledge, by someone not in their insurance plan.
And a recent Stanford study shows that these "surprise" bills continue to become more ubiquitous. They are up from about 33% of visits in 2010 to almost 43% in 2016. For inpatient stays, the number is even more alarming: the jump goes from 26% to 42%, with the average cost per patient rising from $804 to $2,040. It's an issue that only adds to the overwhelming debt bubble we have again created in the U.S.
The opinion piece notes that these rising costs come not from hospitals, but rather from the "backwaters of the financial markets":
The prices of junk bonds issued by “physician services companies” have been sliding in the past month as their owners weigh the possibility and costs of political intervention. These point to the real source of the problem: private equity’s silent colonisation of parts of the healthcare profession.
Read the entire article
These "surprise" medical bills continue to be a major talking point in the U.S. and are likely to be a key issue during the upcoming 2020 Presidential race. The term refers to invoices that are generated after a patient is admitted to the hospital and treated, without their knowledge, by someone not in their insurance plan.
And a recent Stanford study shows that these "surprise" bills continue to become more ubiquitous. They are up from about 33% of visits in 2010 to almost 43% in 2016. For inpatient stays, the number is even more alarming: the jump goes from 26% to 42%, with the average cost per patient rising from $804 to $2,040. It's an issue that only adds to the overwhelming debt bubble we have again created in the U.S.
The opinion piece notes that these rising costs come not from hospitals, but rather from the "backwaters of the financial markets":
The prices of junk bonds issued by “physician services companies” have been sliding in the past month as their owners weigh the possibility and costs of political intervention. These point to the real source of the problem: private equity’s silent colonisation of parts of the healthcare profession.
Read the entire article
October 7, 2019
The Repo Market Incident May Be The Tip Of The Iceberg
The Federal Reserve has injected $278 billion into the securities repurchase market for the first time. Numerous justifications have been provided to explain why this has happened and, more importantly, why it lasted for various days. The first explanation was quite simplistic: an unexpected tax payment. This made no sense. If there is ample liquidity and investors are happy to take financing positions at negative rates all over the world, the abrupt rise in repo rates would simply vanish in a few hours.
Let us start with definitions. The repo market is where borrowers seeking cash offer lenders collateral in the form of safe securities. Repo rates are the interest rate paid to borrow cash in exchange for Treasuries for 24 hours.
Sudden bursts in the repo lending market are not unusual. What is unusual is that it takes days to normalize and even more unusual to see that the Federal Reserve needs to inject hundreds of billions in a few days to offset the unstoppable rise in short-term rates.
Because liquidity is ample, thirst for yield is enormous and financial players are financially more solvent than years ago, right? Wrong.
What the Repo Market Crisis shows us is that liquidity is substantially lower than what the Federal Reserve believes, that fear of contagion and rising risk are evident in the weakest link of the financial repression machine (the overnight market) and, more importantly, that liquidity providers probably have significantly more leverage than many expected.
Read the entire article
Let us start with definitions. The repo market is where borrowers seeking cash offer lenders collateral in the form of safe securities. Repo rates are the interest rate paid to borrow cash in exchange for Treasuries for 24 hours.
Sudden bursts in the repo lending market are not unusual. What is unusual is that it takes days to normalize and even more unusual to see that the Federal Reserve needs to inject hundreds of billions in a few days to offset the unstoppable rise in short-term rates.
Because liquidity is ample, thirst for yield is enormous and financial players are financially more solvent than years ago, right? Wrong.
What the Repo Market Crisis shows us is that liquidity is substantially lower than what the Federal Reserve believes, that fear of contagion and rising risk are evident in the weakest link of the financial repression machine (the overnight market) and, more importantly, that liquidity providers probably have significantly more leverage than many expected.
Read the entire article
October 4, 2019
Will The Drive To Devalue The Dollar Lead To A Plaza Accord 2.0?
The Lead-Up to the Plaza Accord
To understand the Plaza Accord, one has to look back to August 15, 1971. On this day Richard Nixon closed the gold window. This step de facto ended the Bretton Woods system, which had been created in 1944 in the New Hampshire town of the same name and was formally terminated in 1973. The era of gold-backed currency was well and truly over; the era of flexible exchange rates had begun. Without a gold anchor, the exchange rate of every currency pair was supposed to be driven exclusively by supply and demand. National central banks — and indirectly governments as well — were at liberty to make their own decisions, free of the tight restrictions imposed by a gold standard, but they had to bear the costs of their decisions in the form of the devaluation or appreciation of their currencies. While a gold-backed currency aims to impose discipline on nations, a system of flexible exchange rates enables national idiosyncrasies to be preserved, with the exchange rate serving as a balancing mechanism.
However, unlike any other currency system, the system of free-floating currencies invites governments and central banks to manipulate exchange rates practically at will. Without reciprocal agreements, which can provide planning security to export-oriented companies in particular, the danger of international chaos is very high, as the system of flexible exchange rates lacks an external anchor.
In order to prevent this chaos, a repetition of the traumatic devaluation spiral of the 1930s, and the resulting disintegration of the global economy, IMF member nations agreed in 1976 at a meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, that “the exchange rate should be economically justified. Countries should avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to avoid the need to regulate the balance of payments or gain an unfair competitive advantage." And in this multilateral spirit — albeit under an US initiative that was strongly tinged by self-interest — an agreement was struck nine years later that has entered the economic history books as the Plaza Accord.
Read the entire article
To understand the Plaza Accord, one has to look back to August 15, 1971. On this day Richard Nixon closed the gold window. This step de facto ended the Bretton Woods system, which had been created in 1944 in the New Hampshire town of the same name and was formally terminated in 1973. The era of gold-backed currency was well and truly over; the era of flexible exchange rates had begun. Without a gold anchor, the exchange rate of every currency pair was supposed to be driven exclusively by supply and demand. National central banks — and indirectly governments as well — were at liberty to make their own decisions, free of the tight restrictions imposed by a gold standard, but they had to bear the costs of their decisions in the form of the devaluation or appreciation of their currencies. While a gold-backed currency aims to impose discipline on nations, a system of flexible exchange rates enables national idiosyncrasies to be preserved, with the exchange rate serving as a balancing mechanism.
However, unlike any other currency system, the system of free-floating currencies invites governments and central banks to manipulate exchange rates practically at will. Without reciprocal agreements, which can provide planning security to export-oriented companies in particular, the danger of international chaos is very high, as the system of flexible exchange rates lacks an external anchor.
In order to prevent this chaos, a repetition of the traumatic devaluation spiral of the 1930s, and the resulting disintegration of the global economy, IMF member nations agreed in 1976 at a meeting in Kingston, Jamaica, that “the exchange rate should be economically justified. Countries should avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to avoid the need to regulate the balance of payments or gain an unfair competitive advantage." And in this multilateral spirit — albeit under an US initiative that was strongly tinged by self-interest — an agreement was struck nine years later that has entered the economic history books as the Plaza Accord.
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