There's been talk that the Federal Reserve will slam interest rates to zero or even negative when the next recession strikes. President Trump's support for negative interest rates has quickly increased in the last several months as the latest tracking estimates for Q4 GDP have tumbled to sub 0.4%.
It seems that policy rates in the US are too high -- and will likely conform to the rest of the world, which is near zero to negative territory. This has undoubtedly alarmed UBS CEO Sergio Ermotti, who said banks have "no choice" but to pass on the negative rate pain to customers.
Ermotti said UBS "will not pass negative rates to smaller clients, the personal banking clients," that's because if UBS and other EU banks actually passed along negative rates to poor and middle-class families -- that would quickly spark unwanted social unrest that could crash the entire system.
"Right now, the threshold is very high still," Ermotti said. "It's difficult to make a prediction right now, but we are quite convinced it's not going to go down to smaller investors."
And of course, banking elites are smart enough not to pass on negative rates to poor people, but as per the Bloomberg interview, Ermotti will be targeting high-net-worth investors with more than 500,000 euros or 2 million Swiss francs.
G4 policy rates are near zero, with the exclusion of the US. But with the Federal Reserve embarking on a new interest rate cut cycle in response to collapsing global growth, it seems that policy rates across the world could go deeper into the negative territory through 2020.
The ECB and SNB have slammed rates into negative territory in recent years in hopes to stimulate domestic and regional growth by charging banks to deposit funds, rather than lending to consumers or businesses, Bloomberg noted.
Negative interest rates have been in an absolute disaster in Europe, with Germany teetering on the edge of a recession.
Though Trump on Twitter has been begging for negative rates for the last several months as the US economy grinds to halt in Q4. Trump could see negative rates, but it will be for all the wrong reasons, and then US banks will have to make the decision that European banks are currently going through, which is how to pass along negative rates to customers.
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DAILY BUSINESS REPORT - Financial Updates, International Markets and Business News
Showing posts with label Federal Reserve. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federal Reserve. Show all posts
November 22, 2019
November 15, 2019
One Bank Finally Admits The Fed's "NOT QE" Is Indeed QE... And Could Lead To Financial Collapse
After a month of constant verbal gymnastics (and diarrhea from financial pundit sycophants who can't think creatively or originally and merely parrot their echo chamber in hopes of likes/retweets) by the Fed that the recent launch of $60 billion in T-Bill purchases is anything but QE (whatever you do, don't call it "QE 4", just call it "NOT QE" please), one bank finally had the guts to say what was so obvious to anyone who isn't challenged by simple logic: the Fed's "NOT QE" is really "QE."
In a note warning that the Fed's latest purchase program - whether one calls it QE or NOT QE - will have big, potentially catastrophic costs, Bank of America's Ralph Axel writes that in the aftermath of the Fed's new program of T-bill purchases to increase the amount of reserves in the banking system, the Fed made an effort to repeatedly inform markets that this is not a new round of quantitative easing, and yet as the BofA strategist notes, "in important ways it is similar."
But is it QE? Well, in his October FOMC press conference, Fed Chair Powell said "our T-bill purchases should not be confused with the large-scale asset purchase program that we deployed after the financial crisis. In contrast, purchasing Tbills should not materially affect demand and supply for longer-term securities or financial conditions more broadly." Chair Powell gives a succinct definition of QE as having two basic elements: (1) supporting longer-term security prices, and (2) easing financial conditions.
Here's the problem: as we have said since the beginning, and as Bank of America now writes, "the Fed's T-bill purchase program delivers on both fronts and is therefore similar to QE," with one exception - the element of forward guidance.
The upshot to this attempt to mislead the market what it is doing according to Bank of America, is that:
the Fed is continuing to "ease" even though rate cuts are now on hold, which is supportive of growth, higher interest rates and higher equities, and the Fed is loosening financial conditions by increasing the availability of, and lowering the cost of, leverage, which broadly supports asset prices potentially at the cost of increasing systemic financial risk.
Putting the Fed's "NOT QE" in context: so far the Fed has purchased $66bn of Tbills and may purchase $60bn per month through June 2020, which could result in an increase in the Fed's Treasury holdings by about $500bn.
While we have repeatedly written in the past why we think the Fed's latest asset purchase program is, in fact, QE, below we present BofA's argument why we are right.
As Axel writes, there are two basic mechanisms how T-Bill purchases support longer-term security prices: the increase in cash assets and deposit liabilities on bank balance sheets, and the reduction of funding risk for leveraged buyers of Treasuries, MBS and other financed securities.
For those who have forgotten how the "asset reflation" pathway works, recall that the Fed either buys T-bills from investors such as money market funds, or from primary dealers who do not hold T-bills, but can buy them at auction to sell to the Fed. Buying from investors converts their T-bill holdings into new Fed cash, which in turn winds up on deposit in the banking system. If instead a primary dealer buys a Tbill at auction and sells it to the Fed, the transaction results in new Fed cash placed in the Treasury's cash account, while the dealer balance sheet is unchanged, and the banking system balance is also unchanged. But once the Treasury spends the new Fed cash on a social security payment or a medical insurance bill, etc, the cash enters the banking system and increases the aggregate balance sheet of banks.
Either way, bank balance sheets expand and banks will need to (1) hold more HQLA (high quality liquid assets) against those deposits, and (2) put some of their new cash to work in longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities (or even stocks)? Although banks can be flexible in how they deploy the new cash, it is likely that a portion of it will go into bonds similar to what banks already hold (currently $1.8TN in MBS securities and $770bn in Treasuries, according to Fed H.8 data). And once bonds are bid, other investors have no choice but to reach for even riskier securities, such as stocks.
Meanwhile, while the Fed does not directly lend to leveraged investors, some of the increased cash on hand at banks will likely go into repo markets to fund overnight loans to potential buyers of long-term securities in Treasuries and mortgages. This, as BofA explains, is how the increase in reserves is designed to calm repo markets. The amount of bank lending in repo has increased by about 50% since the end of 2017.
Focusing just on the increasingly more important repo channel, which is one ingredient within overall financial conditions, is becoming more important as reliance on overnight funding and leverage continues to rise. This is because, as BofA shows in its "chart of the day", while banks and security brokers have greatly reduced reliance on overnight funding as a result of Dodd-Frank, the rest of the market has approximately doubled its reliance on overnight funding since the 2008 crisis.
Read the entire article
In a note warning that the Fed's latest purchase program - whether one calls it QE or NOT QE - will have big, potentially catastrophic costs, Bank of America's Ralph Axel writes that in the aftermath of the Fed's new program of T-bill purchases to increase the amount of reserves in the banking system, the Fed made an effort to repeatedly inform markets that this is not a new round of quantitative easing, and yet as the BofA strategist notes, "in important ways it is similar."
But is it QE? Well, in his October FOMC press conference, Fed Chair Powell said "our T-bill purchases should not be confused with the large-scale asset purchase program that we deployed after the financial crisis. In contrast, purchasing Tbills should not materially affect demand and supply for longer-term securities or financial conditions more broadly." Chair Powell gives a succinct definition of QE as having two basic elements: (1) supporting longer-term security prices, and (2) easing financial conditions.
Here's the problem: as we have said since the beginning, and as Bank of America now writes, "the Fed's T-bill purchase program delivers on both fronts and is therefore similar to QE," with one exception - the element of forward guidance.
The upshot to this attempt to mislead the market what it is doing according to Bank of America, is that:
the Fed is continuing to "ease" even though rate cuts are now on hold, which is supportive of growth, higher interest rates and higher equities, and the Fed is loosening financial conditions by increasing the availability of, and lowering the cost of, leverage, which broadly supports asset prices potentially at the cost of increasing systemic financial risk.
Putting the Fed's "NOT QE" in context: so far the Fed has purchased $66bn of Tbills and may purchase $60bn per month through June 2020, which could result in an increase in the Fed's Treasury holdings by about $500bn.
While we have repeatedly written in the past why we think the Fed's latest asset purchase program is, in fact, QE, below we present BofA's argument why we are right.
As Axel writes, there are two basic mechanisms how T-Bill purchases support longer-term security prices: the increase in cash assets and deposit liabilities on bank balance sheets, and the reduction of funding risk for leveraged buyers of Treasuries, MBS and other financed securities.
For those who have forgotten how the "asset reflation" pathway works, recall that the Fed either buys T-bills from investors such as money market funds, or from primary dealers who do not hold T-bills, but can buy them at auction to sell to the Fed. Buying from investors converts their T-bill holdings into new Fed cash, which in turn winds up on deposit in the banking system. If instead a primary dealer buys a Tbill at auction and sells it to the Fed, the transaction results in new Fed cash placed in the Treasury's cash account, while the dealer balance sheet is unchanged, and the banking system balance is also unchanged. But once the Treasury spends the new Fed cash on a social security payment or a medical insurance bill, etc, the cash enters the banking system and increases the aggregate balance sheet of banks.
Either way, bank balance sheets expand and banks will need to (1) hold more HQLA (high quality liquid assets) against those deposits, and (2) put some of their new cash to work in longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities (or even stocks)? Although banks can be flexible in how they deploy the new cash, it is likely that a portion of it will go into bonds similar to what banks already hold (currently $1.8TN in MBS securities and $770bn in Treasuries, according to Fed H.8 data). And once bonds are bid, other investors have no choice but to reach for even riskier securities, such as stocks.
Meanwhile, while the Fed does not directly lend to leveraged investors, some of the increased cash on hand at banks will likely go into repo markets to fund overnight loans to potential buyers of long-term securities in Treasuries and mortgages. This, as BofA explains, is how the increase in reserves is designed to calm repo markets. The amount of bank lending in repo has increased by about 50% since the end of 2017.
Focusing just on the increasingly more important repo channel, which is one ingredient within overall financial conditions, is becoming more important as reliance on overnight funding and leverage continues to rise. This is because, as BofA shows in its "chart of the day", while banks and security brokers have greatly reduced reliance on overnight funding as a result of Dodd-Frank, the rest of the market has approximately doubled its reliance on overnight funding since the 2008 crisis.
Read the entire article
October 21, 2019
Here Is The Real Reason The Fed Restarted QE
In the past month, a feud has erupted in the financial media and across capital markets between defenders of the Fed, who praise the return of its unprecedented easing in the form of $60BN in monthly T-Bill purchases, by refusing to call it by its real name, and instead the Fed's fanclub calls it "not QE" (just so it doesn't appear that ten years after the Fed first launched QE, we are back to square one), and those who happen to be intellectually honest, and call the largest permanent expansion in the Fed's balance sheet, meant to ease financial conditions and boost liquidity across the financial sector, for what it is: QE.
It is this same "not QE" that has boosted the Fed's balance sheet by $200BN in one month, the fastest rate of increase since the financial crisis.
Yet while the Fed's desire to purchase Bills instead of coupon Treasuries was dictated by its superficial desire to distinguish the current "Not QE" from previous "True QEs", even though both tends to inject the same amount of liquidity into the system, which as a reminder is what the Fed's bailout role in the past 11 years has all been about, and only true Fed sycophants are unable to call a spade a spade, the Fed's choice raises a rather thorny question of where the Fed will source those T-bills, because as JPMorgan calculates, the net supply of Bills in 4Q19 and 1Q20 is around $115-$130bn while JPM's economists estimate that at least $200-$250bn of purchases could be required to return reserves to around $1.5tr where they were in early September this year.
That means the Fed might need to source purchases from money-market funds and foreign central banks - which paradoxically would serve to further drain liquidity out of the system. As such, given the limited alternatives, JPM's Nikolas Panagirtzoglou believes that the Fed may be reluctant to do so and if they do, some may chose to leave cash in the Fed’s ON RRP facility which would represent a drain on reserves and make T-bills a less efficient vehicle for reserve creation.
Another key question: what if just returning to the previous reserve baseline is not sufficient, and the Fed needs to return reserves to a higher level than $1.5tr? Indeed, with close to $200bn of reserves injected via overnight and term repos for much of this week...
Read the entire article
It is this same "not QE" that has boosted the Fed's balance sheet by $200BN in one month, the fastest rate of increase since the financial crisis.
Yet while the Fed's desire to purchase Bills instead of coupon Treasuries was dictated by its superficial desire to distinguish the current "Not QE" from previous "True QEs", even though both tends to inject the same amount of liquidity into the system, which as a reminder is what the Fed's bailout role in the past 11 years has all been about, and only true Fed sycophants are unable to call a spade a spade, the Fed's choice raises a rather thorny question of where the Fed will source those T-bills, because as JPMorgan calculates, the net supply of Bills in 4Q19 and 1Q20 is around $115-$130bn while JPM's economists estimate that at least $200-$250bn of purchases could be required to return reserves to around $1.5tr where they were in early September this year.
That means the Fed might need to source purchases from money-market funds and foreign central banks - which paradoxically would serve to further drain liquidity out of the system. As such, given the limited alternatives, JPM's Nikolas Panagirtzoglou believes that the Fed may be reluctant to do so and if they do, some may chose to leave cash in the Fed’s ON RRP facility which would represent a drain on reserves and make T-bills a less efficient vehicle for reserve creation.
Another key question: what if just returning to the previous reserve baseline is not sufficient, and the Fed needs to return reserves to a higher level than $1.5tr? Indeed, with close to $200bn of reserves injected via overnight and term repos for much of this week...
Read the entire article
October 11, 2019
After Unveiling 'NotQE', Fed Eases Liquidity Rules For Foreign Banks (Rescues Deutsche)
Having cracked down on Deutsche Bank in the past, The Fed appears to be playing good-regulator/bad-regulator as The FT reports that Deutsche is expected to benefit most from an imminent change in The Fed's liquidity rules.
Specifically, US banking regulators have dropped an idea to subject local branches of foreign banks to tough new liquidity rules (forcing US branches of foreign banks to hold a minimum level of liquid assets to protect them from a cash crunch).
As The FT further details, people familiar with his thinking say Randal Quarles, the vice-chair for banking supervision at the Fed, accepts the banks’ argument that any liquidity rules on bank branches should only be imposed in conjunction with foreign regulators.
“Without some international agreement, we could have the situation where each country is trying to grab whatever isn’t nailed down if there is another scare.”
And Deutsche Bank benefits most (or rescued from major liquidity needs) since it has by far the largest assets in US branches...
Read the entire article
Specifically, US banking regulators have dropped an idea to subject local branches of foreign banks to tough new liquidity rules (forcing US branches of foreign banks to hold a minimum level of liquid assets to protect them from a cash crunch).
As The FT further details, people familiar with his thinking say Randal Quarles, the vice-chair for banking supervision at the Fed, accepts the banks’ argument that any liquidity rules on bank branches should only be imposed in conjunction with foreign regulators.
“Without some international agreement, we could have the situation where each country is trying to grab whatever isn’t nailed down if there is another scare.”
And Deutsche Bank benefits most (or rescued from major liquidity needs) since it has by far the largest assets in US branches...
Read the entire article
October 7, 2019
The Repo Market Incident May Be The Tip Of The Iceberg
The Federal Reserve has injected $278 billion into the securities repurchase market for the first time. Numerous justifications have been provided to explain why this has happened and, more importantly, why it lasted for various days. The first explanation was quite simplistic: an unexpected tax payment. This made no sense. If there is ample liquidity and investors are happy to take financing positions at negative rates all over the world, the abrupt rise in repo rates would simply vanish in a few hours.
Let us start with definitions. The repo market is where borrowers seeking cash offer lenders collateral in the form of safe securities. Repo rates are the interest rate paid to borrow cash in exchange for Treasuries for 24 hours.
Sudden bursts in the repo lending market are not unusual. What is unusual is that it takes days to normalize and even more unusual to see that the Federal Reserve needs to inject hundreds of billions in a few days to offset the unstoppable rise in short-term rates.
Because liquidity is ample, thirst for yield is enormous and financial players are financially more solvent than years ago, right? Wrong.
What the Repo Market Crisis shows us is that liquidity is substantially lower than what the Federal Reserve believes, that fear of contagion and rising risk are evident in the weakest link of the financial repression machine (the overnight market) and, more importantly, that liquidity providers probably have significantly more leverage than many expected.
Read the entire article
Let us start with definitions. The repo market is where borrowers seeking cash offer lenders collateral in the form of safe securities. Repo rates are the interest rate paid to borrow cash in exchange for Treasuries for 24 hours.
Sudden bursts in the repo lending market are not unusual. What is unusual is that it takes days to normalize and even more unusual to see that the Federal Reserve needs to inject hundreds of billions in a few days to offset the unstoppable rise in short-term rates.
Because liquidity is ample, thirst for yield is enormous and financial players are financially more solvent than years ago, right? Wrong.
What the Repo Market Crisis shows us is that liquidity is substantially lower than what the Federal Reserve believes, that fear of contagion and rising risk are evident in the weakest link of the financial repression machine (the overnight market) and, more importantly, that liquidity providers probably have significantly more leverage than many expected.
Read the entire article
September 27, 2019
Nationalizing The Federal Funds Market
Last week's volatility in the market for fed funds gave a lot of equity managers an opportunity to brush up on their understanding of the workings of the short-term money markets. The Fed of New York was forced to offer cash to the Street in the form of forward repurchase agreements all week. These activities are likely to continue.
Nathan Tankus posted a good discussion of the mechanics of adjusting bank reserves on Twitter last week. He particularly highlights not only the Liquidity Coverage Ratio or LCR, but also the additional liquidity stash meant to fund a resolution of an insolvent money center bank.
Given that we would never actually resolve a bank over $100 billion assets, we wonder why this rule exists: What is the point of the “resolution liquidity” for a G-SIB if we’re likely to just put the bank into an FDIC conservatorship a la Indy Mac and then sell it after a bad asset cleanup?
We appreciate the kudos on our call this past July on CNBC regarding liquidity problems in the markets, but we erred in thinking that merely ending the runoff of the Fed’s portfolio was sufficient. When our colleagues who trade TBA, and agency and whole loan repo, saw cash tightening up in the middle of August, that was a sign that problems lay ahead. Even with the Fed’s operations, the repo market is still displaying a lack of liquidity.
A lot of people asked: what is going on? The best primer we can suggest is the 2018 book “Floored” by Dr. George Selgin of Cato Institute, who has been producing excellent research focused on the mechanics of monetary policy for years. Selgin describes “How a Misguided Fed Experiment Deepened and Prolonged the Great Recession.”
Read the entire article
Nathan Tankus posted a good discussion of the mechanics of adjusting bank reserves on Twitter last week. He particularly highlights not only the Liquidity Coverage Ratio or LCR, but also the additional liquidity stash meant to fund a resolution of an insolvent money center bank.
Given that we would never actually resolve a bank over $100 billion assets, we wonder why this rule exists: What is the point of the “resolution liquidity” for a G-SIB if we’re likely to just put the bank into an FDIC conservatorship a la Indy Mac and then sell it after a bad asset cleanup?
We appreciate the kudos on our call this past July on CNBC regarding liquidity problems in the markets, but we erred in thinking that merely ending the runoff of the Fed’s portfolio was sufficient. When our colleagues who trade TBA, and agency and whole loan repo, saw cash tightening up in the middle of August, that was a sign that problems lay ahead. Even with the Fed’s operations, the repo market is still displaying a lack of liquidity.
A lot of people asked: what is going on? The best primer we can suggest is the 2018 book “Floored” by Dr. George Selgin of Cato Institute, who has been producing excellent research focused on the mechanics of monetary policy for years. Selgin describes “How a Misguided Fed Experiment Deepened and Prolonged the Great Recession.”
Read the entire article
September 26, 2019
Repo Market Guru: "Whatever Changed Last Week Is Clearly Still A Problem"
Last week around this time, most of the self-described repo experts on twitter and elsewhere were pounding the table, screaming to anyone who would listen that the unprecedented spike in overnight general collateral repo from 2.25% to 10% was a non-event, and reflects one-time items such as the mid-September tax remittance, the rapid build up of cash in the Treasury's general account and a flurry of Treasury settlements.
Alas, as we warned, and as the NY Fed today confirmed, the sudden heart attack in the critical, overnight funding market has turned out to be anything but a one-time event. First, as we saw first thing this morning, the latest repo overnight repo operation was the most oversubscribed yet, with $91.95BN in securities tendered for $75BN in reserves, the most yet since the Fed resumed these "unclogging" operations after a decade plus hiatus.
However, the big surprise came later on Wednesday morning, when in an "unexpected" move, the Federal Reserve expanded the size of its two dollar funding operations, the overnight and term repo, from $75BN to $100Bn, and from $30Bn to $60BN heading into quarter-end, effectively injecting up to $250 billion in funding ($30BN in already concluded term repo as well as two $60BN term repos yet to come, together with the $100BN overnight repo, assuming full allottment on all operations, for a grand total of $250BN).
Commenting on this dramatic expansion in Fed liquidity injections, BMO's rates expert ian Lyngen, had a simple, if very powerful observation: "the fact that we’re discussing a quarter trillion dollars is telling as to the depth of the constraint in repo." Indeed a far cry from the "all clear" the twitter repo "experts" were screaming from the top of their lungs last week.
Read the entire article
Alas, as we warned, and as the NY Fed today confirmed, the sudden heart attack in the critical, overnight funding market has turned out to be anything but a one-time event. First, as we saw first thing this morning, the latest repo overnight repo operation was the most oversubscribed yet, with $91.95BN in securities tendered for $75BN in reserves, the most yet since the Fed resumed these "unclogging" operations after a decade plus hiatus.
However, the big surprise came later on Wednesday morning, when in an "unexpected" move, the Federal Reserve expanded the size of its two dollar funding operations, the overnight and term repo, from $75BN to $100Bn, and from $30Bn to $60BN heading into quarter-end, effectively injecting up to $250 billion in funding ($30BN in already concluded term repo as well as two $60BN term repos yet to come, together with the $100BN overnight repo, assuming full allottment on all operations, for a grand total of $250BN).
Commenting on this dramatic expansion in Fed liquidity injections, BMO's rates expert ian Lyngen, had a simple, if very powerful observation: "the fact that we’re discussing a quarter trillion dollars is telling as to the depth of the constraint in repo." Indeed a far cry from the "all clear" the twitter repo "experts" were screaming from the top of their lungs last week.
Read the entire article
August 5, 2019
Fed Rate Cut – Too Little, Too Late, As Trump Hikes Tariffs
We had also warned previously the current extension of the market, combined with overbought conditions, was due for a reversal. That reversal has indeed begun, and short-term sell signals have been triggered.
“As we have noted over the last few weeks, the very tight trading range combined with negative divergences also does not historically suggest continued bullish runs higher without some type of corrective action first.”
This past week, a disappointing cut by the Fed, and increased tariffs on China from the White House, provided the catalysts needed for a very quick market rout.
Again, this is something we discussed over the last couple of weeks with our RIAPRO subscribers previously (30-Day Free Trial). The analysis led us to previously trimming our long positions slightly, and increasing our cash holdings, heading into the Fed announcement.
Read the entire article
“As we have noted over the last few weeks, the very tight trading range combined with negative divergences also does not historically suggest continued bullish runs higher without some type of corrective action first.”
This past week, a disappointing cut by the Fed, and increased tariffs on China from the White House, provided the catalysts needed for a very quick market rout.
Again, this is something we discussed over the last couple of weeks with our RIAPRO subscribers previously (30-Day Free Trial). The analysis led us to previously trimming our long positions slightly, and increasing our cash holdings, heading into the Fed announcement.
Read the entire article
August 1, 2019
“The Stock Market Started To Fall In July…”
Will we look back on the month of July as a critical turning point for the stock market? During the first half of 2019, stock prices soared to record high after record high even though we just kept getting one number after another that indicated that a new economic slowdown was starting. Because of the disappointing performance of the U.S. economy, it was believed that we would see a rate cut from the Federal Reserve on Wednesday, and that is precisely what happened. But instead of rejoicing, investors started to panic a bit, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average ended the day down 333 points. We will get into why that happened in just a little bit. But without a doubt it seems quite odd that the Fed’s very first rate cut since December 2008 actually caused stocks to go down. On a historical basis, interest rates are already very low right now, and so this greatly limits what the Fed will be able to do once the next recession officially begins. Of course most investors are not concerned with such considerations. What they really want is for interest rates to be pushed all the way to the floor as quickly as possible, and so they were quite disappointed with what they heard from Fed Chairman Jay Powell on Wednesday.
But considering the fact that we haven’t seen a rate cut in more than a decade, the truth is that investors should have been thrilled by what happened. When interest rates go down, that tends to promote more economic activity…
As expected, the Fed lowered its federal funds rate by a quarter-percentage point to a range of 2% to 2.25%. The move is likely to ripple through the economy and financial system, nudging down rates for credit cards, home equity lines and auto loans and theoretically sparking more economic activity. While the rate cut should aid borrowers, it will frustrate savers who were just starting to benefit from higher bank account yields.
Read the entire article
But considering the fact that we haven’t seen a rate cut in more than a decade, the truth is that investors should have been thrilled by what happened. When interest rates go down, that tends to promote more economic activity…
As expected, the Fed lowered its federal funds rate by a quarter-percentage point to a range of 2% to 2.25%. The move is likely to ripple through the economy and financial system, nudging down rates for credit cards, home equity lines and auto loans and theoretically sparking more economic activity. While the rate cut should aid borrowers, it will frustrate savers who were just starting to benefit from higher bank account yields.
Read the entire article
June 26, 2019
Exposing The Fed's False QE/QT Narrative With Its Own Data
It doesn’t take much calculation to see that the Fed’s position on quantitative tightening (QT) is blatantly inconsistent with its position on quantitative easing (QE). You only need to notice that the excerpts above, taken together, violate the following pair of postulates:
So financial markets and the economy should respond significantly to both QE and QT—although in opposite directions—or they should respond to neither QE nor QT. To claim otherwise, as in the excerpts above as well as other similar communications, is like arguing that one of the two postulates is wrong in the context of the Fed’s bond portfolio. That seems unlikely, but not impossible. In particular, the first postulate falls short of being an absolute truth, reality sometimes being more complicated than we’d like it to be. Consider that Newtonian physics seemed absolute enough until Einstein came along.
Read the entire article
- When A and B are opposites, the effects of A should be opposite to the effects of B.
- QT is the opposite of QE.
So financial markets and the economy should respond significantly to both QE and QT—although in opposite directions—or they should respond to neither QE nor QT. To claim otherwise, as in the excerpts above as well as other similar communications, is like arguing that one of the two postulates is wrong in the context of the Fed’s bond portfolio. That seems unlikely, but not impossible. In particular, the first postulate falls short of being an absolute truth, reality sometimes being more complicated than we’d like it to be. Consider that Newtonian physics seemed absolute enough until Einstein came along.
Read the entire article
June 11, 2019
For The Equity Markets To Keep Rallying, This Has To Happen...
With markets now pricing in at least three rate-cuts and expectations for a July cut surging to over 80%, belief in a pre-emptive "insurance" cut is now consensus - and The Fed had better not disappoint.
However, as Bloomberg's Ye Xie warns, while, historically, preemptive Fed rate cuts have tended to boost the stock market, this time may be different.
Any student of stock market history would tell you that the Fed’s "insurance" cuts in 1995-1996 and 1998 did extend the bull market and economic expansion.
What’s different this time is that the front-end of the yield curve is much more deeply inverted than in the 1990s. In other words, markets have more aggressively discounted policy easing. With Fed fund futures pricing in about 70 basis points of cuts by year-end, the FOMC has a high bar to keep equity investors happy without fomenting recession fears
Read the entire article
However, as Bloomberg's Ye Xie warns, while, historically, preemptive Fed rate cuts have tended to boost the stock market, this time may be different.
Any student of stock market history would tell you that the Fed’s "insurance" cuts in 1995-1996 and 1998 did extend the bull market and economic expansion.
What’s different this time is that the front-end of the yield curve is much more deeply inverted than in the 1990s. In other words, markets have more aggressively discounted policy easing. With Fed fund futures pricing in about 70 basis points of cuts by year-end, the FOMC has a high bar to keep equity investors happy without fomenting recession fears
Read the entire article
June 5, 2019
The Fed Has No Choice But To Return To Ultra-Low Interest Rates
The current boom is heavily built on credit. This is because in today’s fiat money regime central banks, in close cooperation with commercial banks, increase the quantity of money by extending loans – loans that are not backed by ‘real savings’. The artificial increase in the supply of credit pushes market interest rates downwards – that is, below the levels that would prevail had there been no artificial increase in bank credit supply.
As a result, savings decline, consumption increases and, investment takes off, and a “boom” gets going. However, such a boom can only last so long. Its continuation rests on more and more credit being fed into the system, provided at ever lower interest rates. The last ten years provide a good illustration: The Fed’s lowering of interest rates and monetary expansion in the financial and economic crisis 2008/2009 has helped the banking industry to get back to its business of churning out more and more credit (see chart a).
As credit recovered, and stock and housing prices began to rise again (see chart b). The Fed succeeded in re-establishing the ‘asset price inflation regime’. In December 2015, however, the monetary policy makers in Washington D. C. decided to take away the punch bowl by beginning to raise interest rates. Until December 2018, the Fed had brought back the Federal Funds Rate to a band of between 2.25 to 2.5 per cent. Where to go from here?
The Fed has signaled recently that it wants to take a break as far as any further interest rate decisions are concerned. Financial markets have their own view, though: They seem to expect that the Fed’s hiking cycle is already over, and that the central bank will sooner or later lower interest rates again. The likelihood that this expectation will turn out to be correct is quite high: As the Fed wishes to keep the boom going, it has no choice but to return to the policy of suppressing interest rates.
Read the entire article
As a result, savings decline, consumption increases and, investment takes off, and a “boom” gets going. However, such a boom can only last so long. Its continuation rests on more and more credit being fed into the system, provided at ever lower interest rates. The last ten years provide a good illustration: The Fed’s lowering of interest rates and monetary expansion in the financial and economic crisis 2008/2009 has helped the banking industry to get back to its business of churning out more and more credit (see chart a).
As credit recovered, and stock and housing prices began to rise again (see chart b). The Fed succeeded in re-establishing the ‘asset price inflation regime’. In December 2015, however, the monetary policy makers in Washington D. C. decided to take away the punch bowl by beginning to raise interest rates. Until December 2018, the Fed had brought back the Federal Funds Rate to a band of between 2.25 to 2.5 per cent. Where to go from here?
The Fed has signaled recently that it wants to take a break as far as any further interest rate decisions are concerned. Financial markets have their own view, though: They seem to expect that the Fed’s hiking cycle is already over, and that the central bank will sooner or later lower interest rates again. The likelihood that this expectation will turn out to be correct is quite high: As the Fed wishes to keep the boom going, it has no choice but to return to the policy of suppressing interest rates.
Read the entire article
April 29, 2019
JPMorgan: We Are Fast Approaching The Point Where Banks Run Out Of Liquidity
Last week we first noted that something unexpected has been going on in overnight funding markets: ever since March 20, the Effective Fed Funds rate has been trading above the IOER. This was unexpected for the simple reason that it is not supposed to happen by definition.
As a reminder, ever since the financial crisis, in order to push the effective fed funds rate above zero at a time of trillions in excess reserves, the Fed was compelled to create a corridor system for the fed funds rate which was bound on the bottom and top by two specific rates controlled by the Federal Reserve: the corridor "floor" was the overnight reverse repurchase rate (ON-RRP) which usually coincides with the lower bound of the fed funds rate, while on top, the effective fed funds rate is bound by the rate the Fed pays on Excess Reserves (IOER), i.e., the corridor "ceiling."
Or at least that's the theory. In practice, the effective FF tends to occasionally diverge from this corridor, and when it does, it prompts fears that the Fed is losing control over the most important instrument available to it: the price of money, which is set via the fed funds rate. And ever since March 20, this fear is front and center because as shown in the chart below, starting on March 20, the effective Fed Funds rate rose above the IOER first by just 1 basis point, and then, last Friday spiked as much as 4 bps above IOER.
To explain this bizarre phenomenon in which the EFF has been trading well above IOER in defiance of all of the Fed's monetary orthodoxy, we laid out several possible explanations, including that i) money market outflows around the April 15 tax deadline date and elevated GC repo rates; ii) the continued decline in excess reserves, and most ominously iii) another acute dollar shortage developing across the US banking system.
One day later, PrismFP picked up on this topic and elaborated on the third, and most notable point, concluding that "there has been a dollar funding/shortage issue brewing under our nose for months; it is just coming to fruition now because we are noticing the DXY breaking out higher. In other words, with FHLB’s selling less FF’s, participants are forced to pay a higher rate to find funds, and that drives rate differentials towards the Dollar." Some other notable observations from his latest note which we laid out last week:
Read the entire article
As a reminder, ever since the financial crisis, in order to push the effective fed funds rate above zero at a time of trillions in excess reserves, the Fed was compelled to create a corridor system for the fed funds rate which was bound on the bottom and top by two specific rates controlled by the Federal Reserve: the corridor "floor" was the overnight reverse repurchase rate (ON-RRP) which usually coincides with the lower bound of the fed funds rate, while on top, the effective fed funds rate is bound by the rate the Fed pays on Excess Reserves (IOER), i.e., the corridor "ceiling."
Or at least that's the theory. In practice, the effective FF tends to occasionally diverge from this corridor, and when it does, it prompts fears that the Fed is losing control over the most important instrument available to it: the price of money, which is set via the fed funds rate. And ever since March 20, this fear is front and center because as shown in the chart below, starting on March 20, the effective Fed Funds rate rose above the IOER first by just 1 basis point, and then, last Friday spiked as much as 4 bps above IOER.
To explain this bizarre phenomenon in which the EFF has been trading well above IOER in defiance of all of the Fed's monetary orthodoxy, we laid out several possible explanations, including that i) money market outflows around the April 15 tax deadline date and elevated GC repo rates; ii) the continued decline in excess reserves, and most ominously iii) another acute dollar shortage developing across the US banking system.
One day later, PrismFP picked up on this topic and elaborated on the third, and most notable point, concluding that "there has been a dollar funding/shortage issue brewing under our nose for months; it is just coming to fruition now because we are noticing the DXY breaking out higher. In other words, with FHLB’s selling less FF’s, participants are forced to pay a higher rate to find funds, and that drives rate differentials towards the Dollar." Some other notable observations from his latest note which we laid out last week:
Read the entire article
October 26, 2018
Fed's Mester Says Stocks "Far From" Level That Could Hurt US Economy
Earlier today we noted that a pressing question that has emerged among Wall Street traders following the recent market drop is at what level in the S&P would the "Powell put" be triggered and when could the Fed end its tightening cycle in support of equities (with Goldman recently calculating that the drop in the S&P from its recent September highs is the equivalent of a little over one Fed rate hike).
Well, if Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester is speaking for the broader FOMC - and the Fed Chair - don't hold your breath.
In a prepared speech delivered on Thursday evening in New York titled "The Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy, and Normal Policymaking Now and in the Future" she said that while she acknowledged that "longer-term interest rates moved up, and over the past couple of weeks, volatility in equity markets has increased", financial markets are "far from a scenario" in which falling equity prices would "dash confidence and lead to a significant pullback in risk-taking and spending" that could hurt the U.S. economy, and added that "the S&P 500 index remains higher than it was a year ago. Similar to the swings in the market we saw earlier this year, the movements of late do not seem to be signaling that investors are becoming overly pessimistic."
"While the market volatility poses a risk to the forecast and bears monitoring, it has not led me to change my modal medium- run outlook" she said, suggesting that the market has a long way to fall before at least this hawk pays attention.
Despite market gyrations, Mester said that she expects "growth to come in a tad above 3 percent this year and to be in the 2-3/4 to 3 percent range next year, well above my 2 percent estimate of the economy’s trend growth rate."
Read the entire article
Well, if Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester is speaking for the broader FOMC - and the Fed Chair - don't hold your breath.
In a prepared speech delivered on Thursday evening in New York titled "The Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy, and Normal Policymaking Now and in the Future" she said that while she acknowledged that "longer-term interest rates moved up, and over the past couple of weeks, volatility in equity markets has increased", financial markets are "far from a scenario" in which falling equity prices would "dash confidence and lead to a significant pullback in risk-taking and spending" that could hurt the U.S. economy, and added that "the S&P 500 index remains higher than it was a year ago. Similar to the swings in the market we saw earlier this year, the movements of late do not seem to be signaling that investors are becoming overly pessimistic."
"While the market volatility poses a risk to the forecast and bears monitoring, it has not led me to change my modal medium- run outlook" she said, suggesting that the market has a long way to fall before at least this hawk pays attention.
Despite market gyrations, Mester said that she expects "growth to come in a tad above 3 percent this year and to be in the 2-3/4 to 3 percent range next year, well above my 2 percent estimate of the economy’s trend growth rate."
Read the entire article
October 12, 2018
Whalen: Donald Trump Is Right About The Fed
President Donald Trump has been criticizing the Federal Open Market Committee for raising interest rates. The reaction of the US equity markets is self explanatory. But while the economist love cult in the Big Media may take umbrage at President Trump’s critique of the central bank, in fact Trump is dead right.
First, the Fed’s actions in terms of buying $4 trillion in Treasury debt and mortgage paper has badly crippled the value of the fixed income market as a measure of risk. The Treasury yield curve no longer accurately describes the term structure of interest rates or risk premiums. This means that the Treasury yield curve is useless as an indicator of or guide for policy. Nobody at the Federal Reserve Board understands this issue or cares.
Second, Operation Twist further manipulated and distorted the Treasury market. By selling short-term paper and buying long dated securities, the Fed suppressed long-term interest rates, again making indicators like the 10-year Treasury bond useless as an measure of risk. Without QE 2-3 and Operation Twist, the 10-Year Treasury would be well over 4% by now. Instead it is 3% and change and will probably rally to test 3% between now and year end.
Third is the real issuing bothering President Trump, even if he cannot find the precise words, namely liquidity. We have the illusion of liquidity in the financial markets today. Sell Side firms are prohibited by Dodd-Frank and the Volcker Rule from deploying capital in the cash equity and debt markets. All bank portfolios are now passive. No trading, no market making. There is nobody to catch the falling knife.
The only credit being extended today in the short-term markets is with collateral. There is no longer any unsecured lending between banks and, especially, non-banks. As we noted in The Institutional Risk Analyst earlier this week, there are scores of nonbank lenders in mortgages, autos and consumer unsecured lending that are ready to go belly up. Half of the non-bank mortgage lenders in the US are in default on their bank credit lines. As in 2007, the model builders at the Fed in Washington have no idea nor do they care to hear outside opinions.
Read the entire article
First, the Fed’s actions in terms of buying $4 trillion in Treasury debt and mortgage paper has badly crippled the value of the fixed income market as a measure of risk. The Treasury yield curve no longer accurately describes the term structure of interest rates or risk premiums. This means that the Treasury yield curve is useless as an indicator of or guide for policy. Nobody at the Federal Reserve Board understands this issue or cares.
Second, Operation Twist further manipulated and distorted the Treasury market. By selling short-term paper and buying long dated securities, the Fed suppressed long-term interest rates, again making indicators like the 10-year Treasury bond useless as an measure of risk. Without QE 2-3 and Operation Twist, the 10-Year Treasury would be well over 4% by now. Instead it is 3% and change and will probably rally to test 3% between now and year end.
Third is the real issuing bothering President Trump, even if he cannot find the precise words, namely liquidity. We have the illusion of liquidity in the financial markets today. Sell Side firms are prohibited by Dodd-Frank and the Volcker Rule from deploying capital in the cash equity and debt markets. All bank portfolios are now passive. No trading, no market making. There is nobody to catch the falling knife.
The only credit being extended today in the short-term markets is with collateral. There is no longer any unsecured lending between banks and, especially, non-banks. As we noted in The Institutional Risk Analyst earlier this week, there are scores of nonbank lenders in mortgages, autos and consumer unsecured lending that are ready to go belly up. Half of the non-bank mortgage lenders in the US are in default on their bank credit lines. As in 2007, the model builders at the Fed in Washington have no idea nor do they care to hear outside opinions.
Read the entire article
June 18, 2018
Deutsche: "This Is The Most Dangerous Development The Fed Wants To Avoid"
In the first week of February, in the trading session just before the February 5 VIX termination, the market tumbled as a result of a January average hourly earnings number that surged (even though as we explained at the time, the market had wildly misinterpreted the print), prompting speculation that the Fed was dangerously behind the curve and would need to accelerate its tightening, potentially hiking rates more than just 4 times in 2018, leading to an accelerating liquidation of risk assets which eventually culminated in the record VIX spike.
Since then, inflation fears moderated following several downward revisions (as expected) and more tame hourly earnings prints, with market concerns instead shifting to trader wars, the return of populism to Europe, the tech bubble, and the sustainability of record margins and net income.
But according to a recent analysis by Deutsche Bank's Aleksandar Kocic, traders are ignoring the risk of an imminent, "phase shift" spike in wages at their own risk. Specifically, Kocic looks at the current locus of the Philips curve - which many economists have left for dead due to its seeming failure to explain how the plunge in unemployment to record low levels has failed to boost wages - and notes that as the economy approaches the full employment, "wages tend to become more responsive." This, to the Deutsche Bank analyst, "is the inflection point that the Fed is monitoring."
Looking at the Phillips curve over the past 4 economic cycles, Kocic compares it to the Cheshire cat's smile from Alice in Wonderland, which is present even when the actual cat body is no longer there: "In each cycle, it falls apart, but after every annihilation, it re-composes itself and continues to play an important role."
Specifically, what Kocic highlights, is the sudden phase transitions between the end of one cycle and the start of another, in which one observes a "near vertical" spike in inflation to the smallest favorable change in underlying conditions. In the DB chart below, each cycle has a different color which implicitly marks their beginning and end.
Read the entire article
Since then, inflation fears moderated following several downward revisions (as expected) and more tame hourly earnings prints, with market concerns instead shifting to trader wars, the return of populism to Europe, the tech bubble, and the sustainability of record margins and net income.
But according to a recent analysis by Deutsche Bank's Aleksandar Kocic, traders are ignoring the risk of an imminent, "phase shift" spike in wages at their own risk. Specifically, Kocic looks at the current locus of the Philips curve - which many economists have left for dead due to its seeming failure to explain how the plunge in unemployment to record low levels has failed to boost wages - and notes that as the economy approaches the full employment, "wages tend to become more responsive." This, to the Deutsche Bank analyst, "is the inflection point that the Fed is monitoring."
Looking at the Phillips curve over the past 4 economic cycles, Kocic compares it to the Cheshire cat's smile from Alice in Wonderland, which is present even when the actual cat body is no longer there: "In each cycle, it falls apart, but after every annihilation, it re-composes itself and continues to play an important role."
Specifically, what Kocic highlights, is the sudden phase transitions between the end of one cycle and the start of another, in which one observes a "near vertical" spike in inflation to the smallest favorable change in underlying conditions. In the DB chart below, each cycle has a different color which implicitly marks their beginning and end.
Read the entire article
June 15, 2018
The Fed Is "Living Dangerously" - The Great Financial Crisis "Will Be Eclipsed"
Since Hayek’s time, monetary policy, particularly in America, has evolved away from targeting production and discouraging savings by suppressing interest rates, towards encouraging consumption through expanding consumer finance. American consumers are living beyond their means and have commonly depleted all their liquid savings. But given the variations in the cost of consumer finance (between 0% car loans and 20% credit card and overdraft rates), consumers are generally insensitive to changes in interest rates.
Therefore, despite the rise of consumer finance, we can still regard Hayek’s triangle as illustrating the driving force behind the credit cycle, and the unsustainable excesses of unprofitable debt created by suppressing interest rates as the reason monetary policy always leads to an economic crisis. The chart below shows we could be living dangerously close to another tipping point, whereby the rises in the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) might be about to trigger a new credit and economic crisis.
Previous peaks in the FFR coincided with the onset of economic downturns, because they exposed unsustainable business models. On the basis of simple extrapolation, the area between the two dotted lines, which roughly join these peaks, is where the current FFR cycle can be expected to peak. It is currently standing at about 2% after yesterday’s increase, and the Fed expects the FFR to average 3.1% in 2019. The chart tells us the Fed is already living dangerously with yesterday’s hike, and further rises will all but guarantee a credit crisis.
The reason successive interest rate peaks have been on a declining trend is bound up in the rising level of outstanding debt and loans, shown by the red line on the chart. Besides a temporary slowdown during the last credit crisis, debt has been increasing over every cycle. Instead of sequential credit crises eliminating malinvestments, it is clear the Fed has prevented debt liquidation for at least the last forty years. The accumulation of debt since the 1980s is behind the reason for the decline in interest rate peaks over time.
Read the entire article
Therefore, despite the rise of consumer finance, we can still regard Hayek’s triangle as illustrating the driving force behind the credit cycle, and the unsustainable excesses of unprofitable debt created by suppressing interest rates as the reason monetary policy always leads to an economic crisis. The chart below shows we could be living dangerously close to another tipping point, whereby the rises in the Fed Funds Rate (FFR) might be about to trigger a new credit and economic crisis.
Previous peaks in the FFR coincided with the onset of economic downturns, because they exposed unsustainable business models. On the basis of simple extrapolation, the area between the two dotted lines, which roughly join these peaks, is where the current FFR cycle can be expected to peak. It is currently standing at about 2% after yesterday’s increase, and the Fed expects the FFR to average 3.1% in 2019. The chart tells us the Fed is already living dangerously with yesterday’s hike, and further rises will all but guarantee a credit crisis.
The reason successive interest rate peaks have been on a declining trend is bound up in the rising level of outstanding debt and loans, shown by the red line on the chart. Besides a temporary slowdown during the last credit crisis, debt has been increasing over every cycle. Instead of sequential credit crises eliminating malinvestments, it is clear the Fed has prevented debt liquidation for at least the last forty years. The accumulation of debt since the 1980s is behind the reason for the decline in interest rate peaks over time.
Read the entire article
February 22, 2018
Treasury Proposes Dubious, Untested Chapter 14 Bankruptcies for Too Big to Fail Banks
The Trump Treasury has proposed changing Dodd Frank rules, supposedly to make resolving Too Big to Fail banks easier.
The Treasury yesterday proposed replacing the resolution scheme under Dodd Frank, called the Orderly Liquidation Authority, confusingly also called Title II liquidations, with a new type of bankruptcy, Chapter 14. While there was a lot not to like about the OLA, Chapter 14 is no better and in key respects, markedly worse.
The costly fallacy underlying Chapter 14 is the idea that big banks can be wound up without a taxpayer backstop. And despite Treasury’s chest thumping that taxpayer monies won’t be at risk, in fact, government funding is still available if needed.
And like it or not, that makes sense. The reality is that banks provide critical infrastructure for commerce, known as a payment system. Recall that in the crisis, the authorities had to guarantee money market mutual funds up to $250,000 because the Lehman implosion brought down the Reserve Fund, precipitating a run on mutual funds. Mutual funds are big participants in the repo market, which is critical for financing the trading of banks and large investors.
We’ve embedded the Treasury proposal at the end of this post. Note that some measures could be implemented by regulators directly, but the Chapter 14 scheme requires Congressional approval.
Read the entire article
The Treasury yesterday proposed replacing the resolution scheme under Dodd Frank, called the Orderly Liquidation Authority, confusingly also called Title II liquidations, with a new type of bankruptcy, Chapter 14. While there was a lot not to like about the OLA, Chapter 14 is no better and in key respects, markedly worse.
The costly fallacy underlying Chapter 14 is the idea that big banks can be wound up without a taxpayer backstop. And despite Treasury’s chest thumping that taxpayer monies won’t be at risk, in fact, government funding is still available if needed.
And like it or not, that makes sense. The reality is that banks provide critical infrastructure for commerce, known as a payment system. Recall that in the crisis, the authorities had to guarantee money market mutual funds up to $250,000 because the Lehman implosion brought down the Reserve Fund, precipitating a run on mutual funds. Mutual funds are big participants in the repo market, which is critical for financing the trading of banks and large investors.
We’ve embedded the Treasury proposal at the end of this post. Note that some measures could be implemented by regulators directly, but the Chapter 14 scheme requires Congressional approval.
Read the entire article
February 21, 2018
Brandon Smith: New Fed Chairman Will Trigger A Historic Stock Market Crash In 2018
Ever since the credit and equities crash of 2008, Americans have been bombarded relentlessly with the narrative that our economy is “in recovery”. For some people, simply hearing this ad nauseam is enough to stave off any concerns they may have for the economy. For some of us, however, it’s just not satisfactory. We need concrete data that actually supports the notion, and for years, we have seen none.
In fact, we have heard from officials at the Federal Reserve that the exact opposite is true. They have admitted that the so-called recovery has been fiat driven, and that there is a danger that when the Fed finally stops artificially propping up the economy with constant stimulus and near zero interest rates, the whole farce might come tumbling down.
For example, Richard Fisher, former head of the Dallas Federal Reserve, admitted a few years ago that the U.S. central bank has made its business the manipulation of the stock market to the upside:
Fisher went on to hint at the impending danger (though his predicted drop is overly conservative in my view), saying: “I was warning my colleagues, don’t go wobbly if we have a 10-20% correction at some point…. Everybody you talk to … has been warning that these markets are heavily priced.”
Read the entire article
In fact, we have heard from officials at the Federal Reserve that the exact opposite is true. They have admitted that the so-called recovery has been fiat driven, and that there is a danger that when the Fed finally stops artificially propping up the economy with constant stimulus and near zero interest rates, the whole farce might come tumbling down.
For example, Richard Fisher, former head of the Dallas Federal Reserve, admitted a few years ago that the U.S. central bank has made its business the manipulation of the stock market to the upside:
- What the Fed did — and I was part of that group — is we front-loaded a tremendous market rally, starting in 2009.
- It’s sort of what I call the “reverse Whimpy factor” — give me two hamburgers today for one tomorrow.
- I’m not surprised that almost every index you can look at … was down significantly.
Fisher went on to hint at the impending danger (though his predicted drop is overly conservative in my view), saying: “I was warning my colleagues, don’t go wobbly if we have a 10-20% correction at some point…. Everybody you talk to … has been warning that these markets are heavily priced.”
Read the entire article
January 31, 2018
US Futures Rebound After Trump's SOTU Speech; Dollar Slide Resumes Ahead Of Fed
S&P futures rebounded 0.3% from the worst two-day selloff since Sept. 2016, and European and Asian stocks rose modestly from early weakness after Trump's SOTU address did not deliver any major surprises, while traders were cautious ahead of the Fed’s last rate decision under Janet Yellen’s leadership expected to lean on the hawkish side.
On Tuesday, U.S. stocks tumbled amid concerns about a recent sharp rally in bond yields. Health-care shares slumped after Amazon.com, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan agreed to collaborate on ways to offer health-care services to their employees; drugmakers will be in the spotlight again as Trump says prescription drug prices will come down "substantially."
Despite the recent drop, it’s been a stellar month for stock markets, with major gains across most major gauges that were followed this week by the MSCI All-Country World Index’s biggest two-day slide since September 2016. Investors will now focus on Wednesday’s Federal Reserve rate decision, the ongoing earnings season and more big economic data points to see if the uptrend can resume.
On Tuesday night, Donald Trump sought to connect his presidency to the nation’s prosperity in his first State of the Union address, arguing the U.S. has arrived at a “new American moment” of wealth and opportunity. Trump vowed the “era of economic surrender is over,” but stopped short of naming the targets of his efforts to narrow the U.S.’s ballooning trade deficit, which prevented a major market reaction.
Trump also stated the US is finally seeing rising wages and that unemployment claims have hit a 45-year low. Trump also called on Congress to produce a bill that generates at least USD 1.5tln for new infrastructure investment and said that they will work to fix bad trade deals.
Read the entire article
On Tuesday, U.S. stocks tumbled amid concerns about a recent sharp rally in bond yields. Health-care shares slumped after Amazon.com, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan agreed to collaborate on ways to offer health-care services to their employees; drugmakers will be in the spotlight again as Trump says prescription drug prices will come down "substantially."
Despite the recent drop, it’s been a stellar month for stock markets, with major gains across most major gauges that were followed this week by the MSCI All-Country World Index’s biggest two-day slide since September 2016. Investors will now focus on Wednesday’s Federal Reserve rate decision, the ongoing earnings season and more big economic data points to see if the uptrend can resume.
On Tuesday night, Donald Trump sought to connect his presidency to the nation’s prosperity in his first State of the Union address, arguing the U.S. has arrived at a “new American moment” of wealth and opportunity. Trump vowed the “era of economic surrender is over,” but stopped short of naming the targets of his efforts to narrow the U.S.’s ballooning trade deficit, which prevented a major market reaction.
Trump also stated the US is finally seeing rising wages and that unemployment claims have hit a 45-year low. Trump also called on Congress to produce a bill that generates at least USD 1.5tln for new infrastructure investment and said that they will work to fix bad trade deals.
Read the entire article
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